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INTRODUCTION 
Although the threats of global climate change1 are by no 
means limited to coastal areas,2 coastal cities face extreme and 
 
1. Some definitions of “climate change” focus on changes in climate caused by 
human activities only, while others include all changes in climate, whether caused by 
human activity or natural variability in climate.  See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND 
VULNERABILITY 6 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter AR4 WGII], available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report
_wg2_report_impacts_adaptation_and_vulnerability.htm [http://perma.cc/LF39-GG33] 
(“IPCC usage refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural 
variability or as a result of human activity.  This usage differs from that in the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, where climate change refers to a change of 
climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the 
composition of the global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate 
variability observed over comparable time periods.”).  A handful of scholars advocate 
for use of the term “climate disruption,” first coined by John Holdren, rather than 
“global warming” or “climate change,” arguing that climate disruption is a more 
accurate, active and instrumental term.  See David Malakoff, Let’s Call It ‘Climate 
Disruption,’ White House Science Adviser Suggests (Again), SCIENCE (May 2, 2014, 3:15 
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unique challenges.  Global temperatures are increasing and the 
rate of increase is accelerating—with corresponding increases 
in sea levels, acidification of oceans, and losses of flood-
mitigating wetlands.3  Storms and other extreme weather 
events are increasing in frequency and severity.4  As a result, 
coastal communities are already experiencing rising sea levels, 
eroding shores, more massive storm surges, more severe 
storms, salt water intrusion, loss of land and changes in 
marine resources5—and all cities can expect increased 
incidences of, and more extreme, storms, heat waves, droughts, 
and other extreme weather conditions.6 
New York City in particular faces grave threats from climate 
change.  With 520 miles of coastline, the City’s coastline is 
longer than the coastlines of Miami, Boston, Los Angeles, and 
San Francisco combined.7  According to the New York City 
Mayor’s Office, more than eight million New Yorkers live in 
areas vulnerable to flooding, storm surges and other natural 
disaster-related risks.8  Nearly half a million of these residents 
live on 120 square miles of land that is less than 6 feet above 
the high tide line.9  This extremely vulnerable land is also 
 
PM), available at http://news.sciencemag.org/climate/2014/05/lets-call-it-climate-
disruption-white-house-science-adviser-suggests-again [http://perma.cc/9WBC-TC26]. 
2. See, e.g., John R. Nolon, Land Use and Climate Change Bubbles:  Resilience, 
Retreat and Due Diligence, 39 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 337, 343 (2015) 
(discussing climate change related real estate market collapses in Sidney, a village 
located along the Susquehanna River in the Catskill Mountains of New York; 
Spicewood Beach, a lakeside community in Texas; and Elkhart, a small farming town 
in southwestern Kansas).  
3. See infra Part II.A.  
4. See id. 
5. See id.  Of course, the effects of these changes are not limited to coastal cities, nor 
are the consequences of direct harms to coastal cities limited to those localities.  See 
generally Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and the Fifth 
Assessment Report, in Sarah Adams-Schoen et al., A Response to the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10027, 10031 (2015) (discussing 
global interdependencies with respect to the effect of climate change-related harms).  
6. See infra Part II.A. 
7. CITY OF NEW YORK, PLANYC:  A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK 40 (June 
2013) [hereinafter STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
sirr/html/report/report.shtml [http://perma.cc/C58V-B56D]. 
8. Id. at 207.  
9. BEN STRAUSS ET AL., NEW YORK AND THE SURGING SEA:  A VULNERABILITY 
ASSESSMENT WITH PROJECTIONS FOR SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL FLOOD RISK, 
CLIMATE CENTRAL RESEARCH REPORT 8 (2014), available at http://sealevel.climate 
central.org/uploads/ssrf/NY-Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/3KFX-6LDZ].  Super Storm 
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home to property valuing $101 billion, more than 1,500 miles of 
road, 1,200 EPA-listed sites, and 100 public schools.10 
Given these vulnerabilities, it may not be surprising that 
New York City is on a short list of U.S. cities that began 
proactively planning for future climate-change related risks in 
the early 2000s.11  Since then, the city has assessed its 
vulnerabilities, planned for, and, significantly, begun 
implementing extensive mitigation12 and adaptation13 
initiatives.14  But, notwithstanding New York City’s arguably 
proactive15 commitment to climate change resilience,16 on 
 
Sandy’s peak flood elevation was nine feet above the high tide line as measured at the 
Battery in New York City.  Id.  
10. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 8.  
11. The city released PlaNYC:  A Greater, Greener New York, its first long-term 
comprehensive sustainability plan, on Earth Day, April 22, 2007.  See CITY OF NEW 
YORK, PLANYC:  A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK (April 2007) [hereinafter GREENER, 
GREATER], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/publications/publications. 
shtml?process=1&type=Report [http://perma.cc/P24G-7VWM]; see also JoAnn Carmin 
et al., PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN URBAN CLIMATE ADAPTATION PLANNING:  
RESULTS OF A GLOBAL SURVEY 10 (2012) [hereinafter ICLEI 2011 SURVEY], available at 
http://www.icleiusa.org/action-center/learn-from-others/progress-and-challenges-in-
urban-climate-adaptation-planning-results-of-a-global-survey [http://perma.cc/SR62-
4C6A] (stating that as of 2011, only 13% of U.S. cities surveyed had completed even an 
assessment of climate-change related vulnerabilities); infra notes 59–60 & 
accompanying text (discussing ICLEI 2011 SURVEY).  
12. The IPCC defines “mitigation” as “anthropogenic intervention to reduce the 
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases.”  AR4 WGII, supra note 1, at 750.  
13. The IPCC defines “adaptation” as “the adjustment in natural or human systems 
in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates 
harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.”  Id. at 6.  
14. See generally infra Part II. 
15. Although New York City was among a handful of U.S. cities that began 
comprehensive planning for climate change in the early 2000s, from a global 
perspective the city was late to the party.  See Harriet Bulkey & Heike Schroeder, 
Global Cities and the Politics of Climate Change, in HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 249, 250–51 (Peter Dauvergne ed., 2012) (identifying the 
following five U.S. municipalities that participated in a CO2 reduction project which 
began in 1991:  Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota; Portland, Oregon; Chula Vista, 
California; Denver, Colorado; Miami-Dade County, Florida); see also Portland, Or., 
Resolution No. 35207 (Nov. 10, 1993).  
16. The New York City Mayor’s Office defines “resiliency” as “our capacity to 
survive, adapt, and grow in the face of stress and shocks.”  CITY OF NEW YORK, ONE 
CITY, BUILT TO LAST 20 (Revision 1.1 2014), available at http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/builttolast/assets/downloads/pdf/OneCity.pdf  [http://perma.cc/GG49-NHDN].  The 
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction defines “resilience” as “[t]he capacity 
of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting 
or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and 
structure.  This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of 
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October 29, 2012, “Super Storm Sandy” struck a massive blow 
to the Big Apple—which caused the deaths of 44 New 
Yorkers,17 left nearly 2 million people without power,18 and 
resulted in $19 billion in damage19—highlighting the need to 
weigh climate change and disaster resiliency more heavily on 
the City’s policy scales. 
Describing the effect of Sandy on the relative priority of 
climate resilience policies, the City observed that “[i]n October 
2012, with the arrival of Sandy, the case for increased climate 
resiliency—even beyond the initiatives [previously] set 
forth . . . —was forcefully made to all New Yorkers.”20  New 
York City responded by undertaking a prompt and remarkably 
thorough analysis of its climate change resilience, and 
immediately implementing many of the measures identified in 
that analysis.21  This resulted in, among other things, extensive 
amendments to zoning and building codes to transform New 
York City into a more disaster-resilient city22 and to continue 
decreasing New York City’s greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions.23 
A change in the City’s administration on January 1, 2014, 
heralded an even greater commitment to mitigation, additional 
sustainability initiatives, and continued implementation of the 
prior administration’s comprehensive sustainability and 
resilience plans, A Greener, Greater New York and A Stronger, 
More Resilient New York, respectively.24  Among other things, 
 
organizing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better 
future protection and to improve risk reduction measures.” Terminology, U.N. OFFICE 
FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminology-
eng%20home.htm [http://perma.cc/C69Q-BHEV] (last visited May 20, 2015).  This 
article treats the term “resilience” (or “resiliency,” its more popular form in the United 
States) as encompassing both adaptation and mitigation.  See infra Part I.  
17. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 13–14. 
18. Id. at 11.  
19. Id.  
20. Id. at 40.  
21. Id. at 3; see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing Special Initiative for Rebuilding 
and Resiliency).  
22. See infra Part II.B.5 (discussing amendments to New York City’s zoning and 
building codes).  
23. See infra Parts II.B.1 and III.C (discussing GHG emissions reductions targets).  
24. See also CITY OF NEW YORK, PROGRESS REPORT 2014:  A GREENER, GREATER 
NEW YORK, A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK (2014), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/downloads/pdf/publications/140422_PlaNYCP-Report_ 
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Mayor de Blasio’s Administration increased the City’s GHG 
emissions reduction commitment from 30% by 2030 to 80% by 
2050 (from a 2005 baseline), formed the Mayor’s Office of 
Recovery and Resiliency, amended the City’s air pollution code, 
and expressly acknowledged the City’s role in conducting and 
regulating substantial emissions-generating activities.25  In 
2014, the City published its sixth annual progress report on the 
City’s mitigation and resilience initiatives26 and its fourth 
annual benchmarking report on the reduction of GHG 
emissions from buildings,27 adding to a voluminous collection of 
data tracking the City’s strategies, successes, and challenges.28 
Given the robustness of New York City’s approach as well as 
the need for “high adaptation” of coastal cities,29 municipalities 
across the United States, and coastal cities in particular, can 
benefit from examining New York City’s strategies, successes, 
and lessons learned.30  As discussed below, many of New York 
City’s climate change measures have put the City in a league of 
its own, contributing significantly to the City’s resilience, 
decreasing GHG emissions, and providing significant co-
 
FINAL_Web.pdf [http://perma.cc/KN9D-XM7J] [hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT 2014]; 
see generally infra Part II. 
25. See generally infra Part II; PROGRESS REPORT 2014, supra note 24. 
26. See PROGRESS REPORT 2014, supra note 24. 
27. See CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW 84 BENCHMARKING REPORT 
SEPTEMBER 2014 (September 2014), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/ 
downloads/pdf/publications/2014_nyc_ll84_benchmarking_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
QHD5-EV58] [hereinafter BENCHMARKING REPORT 2014]. 
28. See generally PlaNYC Publications, MAYOR’S OFFICE OF RECOVERY & 
RESILIENCY, http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/publications/publications.shtml? 
process=1&type=Report [http://perma.cc/P24G-7VWM] (last visited May 20, 2015) 
(providing downloadable pdfs of 63 City reports related to sustainability).  
29. See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text (discussing AR5 WGII conclusion 
that, based on 2°C and 4°C pathways, sea level related risks like flooding remain 
medium to high even for highly adapted communities).  IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:  
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY:  SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 23 (2014) 
[hereinafter WGII SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS], available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/ 
images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z3RU-JUDJ]. 
30. See generally ICLEI—LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY USA, THE 
PROCESS BEHIND PLANYC:  HOW THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEVELOPED ITS 
COMPREHENSIVE LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY PLAN 5 (2010) [hereinafter ICLEI 
PLANYC CASE STUDY] (evaluating New York City’s sustainability planning process “to 
share the lessons learned from New York with communities around the world”), 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/downloads/pdf/publications/iclei_planyc_ 
case_study_201004.pdf [http://perma.cc/HL5X-7DKE]. 
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benefits31 like improved public health, cleaner air and, 
according to the City, more affordable housing.32 
But, the City also faces a host of challenges that threaten to 
“sink” it, including wicked policy binds, ineffective regional 
structures, a lack of support at the federal level, and other 
conditions that constrain the City’s ability to remain resilient 
such as its massive population, coastal geography, and 
increasingly frequent and intense coastal storms, storm surges, 
and flooding.33  As a result, the City’s climate change resilience 
initiatives may still fall short of what is required to sufficiently 
“moderate[] harm” from dangerous interference with the 
climate system.34 
Part I of this article examines the role of local governments 
in climate change adaptation and mitigation.  Part II discusses 
climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives New York 
City undertook before and after Super Storm Sandy.  Part III 
assesses the City’s initiatives, evaluating which initiatives 
provide role models for other municipalities as well as key 
challenges posed by the City’s approach. 
 
31. AR5 defines “co-benefits” as “positive effects on human health that arise from 
interventions to reduce emissions of those CAPs [climate-altering pollutants] that 
warm the planet or vice versa.”  See K.R. Smith et al., Human Health:  Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Co-Benefits, in IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:  IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, 
AND VULNERABILITY CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 715 (C.B. Field et al. 
eds., 2014), available at https://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WGIIAR5-Chap11_ 
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZV9-BMCK].  For example, increasing “[e]nergy 
efficiency and reducing reliance on coal for electricity generation not only reduces 
emissions of greenhouse gases, but also reduces emissions of fine particles that cause 
many premature deaths worldwide as well as reducing other health impacts from the 
coal fuel cycle.”  Id. at 742; see generally id. at 737–41 (evaluating data on potential co-
benefits from climate adaptation and mitigation measures).   
32. See infra Parts II and III (discussing City’s initiatives); see, e.g., infra Part III.D 
(discussing the City’s robust and transparent data collection, analysis, and 
benchmarking initiatives).  
33. See, e.g., infra Parts III.B and C (discussing “super wicked” problem of 
waterfront development and critiquing City’s GHG emissions reduction targets). 
34. See AR4 WGII, supra note 1, at 6 (defining “adaptation” in terms of 
“moderat[ing] harm or exploit[ing] beneficial opportunities”).  
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I. CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE FROM THE GROUND UP 
Local governments are often referred to as being “on the front 
line” of climate change adaptation.35  The role of local 
governments in climate change mitigation, however, has 
received less attention,36 despite the fact that local 
governments conduct and regulate activities that contribute a 
substantial portion of the global inventory of GHG emissions.37  
As the following discussion of the municipal role in mitigation 
and adaptation shows, 2014 heralded a shift in which 
governmental and nongovernmental bodies at all levels began 
recognizing the central role of local governments in both 
climate change adaptation and mitigation. 
Discussion of municipalities’ mitigation and adaptation roles, 
respectively, and indeed the term “adaptation” itself, however, 
may suggest a false dichotomy that could mislead municipal 
officials and the public into believing resilience can be achieved 
through robust adaptation alone.  The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change’s (“IPCC”) most recent projections 
suggest that the efficacy of adaptation depends on aggressive 
mitigation: 
 
Prospects for climate-resilience pathways for sustainable 
development are related fundamentally to what the world 
accomplishes with climate change mitigation (high confidence).  
Since mitigation reduces the rate as well as the magnitude of 
warming, it also increases the time available for adaptation to a 
particular level of climate change, potentially by several decades.  
 
35. See, e.g., J. Kevin Healy & L. Margaret Barry, Local Initiatives, in GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE & U.S. LAW 375 (Michael B. Gerrard & Jody Freeman eds., 2d ed. 
2014) (referring to local jurisdictions as “the government entities on the front line in 
protecting the health and welfare of their citizens” and therefore principally 
responsible for coping with climate change-related harms). 
36. See Hossein Estiri, 21 Percent:  The Role of Socioeconomics and Housing 
Characteristics on CO2 Emissions from the U.S. Residential Sector 2 (Nov. 1, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2196984 [http://perma.cc/ABG7-XN7P] (criticizing 
climate scientists for initially discounting significance of cities in climate change); 
Cynthia Rosenzweig et al., Cities Lead the Way in Climate-Change Action, 467 NATURE 
909, 909 (2010) (“Cities were initially ignored by most climate-change scientists.”). 
37. See Nancy B. Grimm et al., Global Change and the Ecology of Cities, 319 SCI. 
756 (2008) (showing cities contribute substantially to climate change); Sue Grimmond, 
Urbanization and Global Environmental Change:  Local Effects of Urban Warming, 
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 83 (2007) (showing cities contribute substantially to climate change); 
see also INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 (2014).   
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Delaying mitigation may reduce options for climate-resilient 
pathways in the future.38 
 
In other words, failure to promptly and aggressively mitigate 
climate change will likely significantly diminish the ability of 
coastal communities39 to moderate harms like flooding and 
foreclose opportunities to do so in the future.40  Likewise, 
although mitigation measures can limit the amount of GHG 
emissions, they too are only part of the solution because “much 
of the change in climate over the next 30 to 40 years is already 
determined by past and present emissions.”41  Additionally, 
current and near-future risks from climate change already pose 
significant enough threats that coastal communities must 
undertake adaptation initiatives to protect public health, 
property, and infrastructure.42 
Accordingly, this article treats the concept of resilience 
planning as inclusive of both adaptation and mitigation 
planning, and concludes that effective regulation at the local 
level cannot be achieved through adaptation alone no matter 
how robust.  Additionally, this article urges scholars, lawyers, 
and policy makers to recognize in their communications the 
need for an integrated approach.43 
 
38. WGII SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 29, at 28.  
39. Reference to “coastal communities” here includes all communities that face 
flooding, storm surge, and other risks associated with rising seas, and therefore 
includes estuarine, riverine, and some lakeside communities, among others.  
40. See WGII SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 29, at 23 (showing even 
highly adapted North American communities will face medium to high risks under 
scenarios of global mean temperature increases at 2°C and 4°C above preindustrial 
levels). 
41. SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE, CHANGING OUR WAYS:  SCOTLAND’S CLIMATE CHANGE 
PROGRAMME 76 (2006), available at http://www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/ 
100896/0024396.pdf [http://perma.cc/9PQY-TQD7]; see also Robin Kundis Craig, 
“Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation:  Five Principles for Climate Change 
Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 9 (2010) (“While there is no question that 
successful mitigation strategies remain critical in the quest to avoid worst-case climate 
change scenarios, we have passed the point where mitigation efforts alone can deal 
with the problems that climate change is creating.”). 
42. See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 11; infra note 97 & accompanying text. 
43. See infra Part III.A. 
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A. Municipal Governments and Mitigation 
With respect to mitigation, 2014 marked a shift in the 
recognition of the role of cities.  In 2014, the IPCC issued its 
Fifth Assessment Report (“AR5”), which included for the first 
time in the Mitigation of Climate Change volume of its 
assessment report a separate chapter on urban areas, referred 
to in the chapter title as “human settlements.”44  According to 
the IPCC, “[s]ince the publication of the Fourth Assessment 
Report, there has been a growing recognition of the significant 
contribution of urban areas to GHG emissions, their potential 
role in mitigating them, and a multi-fold increase in the 
corresponding scientific literature.”45 
Clearly, local regulations and activities have the potential to 
significantly impact global emissions levels.  In addition to 
wielding regulatory authority over land uses, building design, 
and transportation, local governments tend to maintain 
sizeable fleets of motor vehicles; own and lease extensive 
building stock; own or operate solid waste transfer stations, 
landfills, sewage treatment plants, and power plants; 
collectively expend millions of dollars annually in product 
procurement; and can influence or control the source of power 
used in the municipality.46  Additionally, the impact of local 
government regulations and conduct is growing as the world 
population continues to concentrate in cities.  As of 2011, more 
than half the global population was urban, as compared to only 
13% in 190047; additionally, urban areas account for 
approximately 75% of global energy use and the same amount 
of CO2 emissions.48  By 2050, the global urban population is 
 
44. K.C. SETA ET AL., CH. 12:  HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND SPATIAL 
PLANNING, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:  MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (O. Edenhofer et al. eds., 2014) 
[hereinafter CH. 12:  HUMAN SETTLEMENTS].  
45. Id. at 929.  
46. Healy & Barry, supra note 35, at 375–76.  I use “local government” and 
“municipality” interchangeably.  Municipalities are political subdivisions, including 
cities, towns, villages, and districts such as school districts and sewer districts.  
Municipality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), available at http://thelaw 
dictionary.org/municipality/ [http://perma.cc/QTT5-5B5C]. 
47. CH. 12:  HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, supra note 44, at 929.  
48. Id.  
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projected to grow by between 2.5 to 3 billion, corresponding to 
nearly 70% of the world’s population.49 
Despite the “significant contribution of urban areas to GHG 
emissions [and] their potential role in mitigating them,”50 as 
well as the laudable efforts of many cities,51 AR5 also found 
that “[t]housands of Cities are undertaking climate action 
plans, but their aggregate impact on urban emissions is 
uncertain (robust evidence, high agreement).”52  Although this 
finding could be construed as support for the normative 
position that climate change mitigation is not an appropriate 
pursuit for local governments,53 the uncertain aggregate impact 
of thousands of cities’ mitigation efforts probably does not 
indicate that local governments are somehow inherently less 
able to meaningfully reduce GHG emissions than state, federal 
or international entities.  Rather, the finding instead likely 
indicates the need for more and different action at the local 
government level,54 more support and coordination between 
levels of government,55 and more transparency and 
accountability.56 
B. Municipal Governments and Adaptation 
In the United States, municipal governments have made 
significant contributions to adaptation planning and 
implementation, at least as compared to the federal and state 
governments.  However, U.S. municipalities lag behind their 
 
49. Id. at 942.  
50. Id. at 929. 
51. See, e.g., supra note 15 (identifying U.S. municipalities that participated in a 
CO2 reduction project that began in 1991).  
52. CH. 12:  HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, supra note 44, at 929.  
53. See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, State Eyes on the Climate Policy Prize, 27 ENVTL. F. 
16, 16 (July/Aug. 2010) (arguing that state and local climate change mitigation 
“make[s] no sense”); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally:  The Limits of 
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007).  But see Jonathan 
Rosenbloom, Urban Community Collaborative, in Adams-Schoen et al., supra note 5, at 
10039 (posing the question “But if the international community is unable to act and 
there is a willingness among local governments to act, then why not allow them to do 
so?”). 
54. See infra Part III.F (discussing the relatively small number of local governments 
undertaking climate action planning and the even smaller number of local 
governments that have moved from planning to implementation). 
55. See infra Part III.F (discussing the lack of local-state-federal integration). 
56. See infra Part III.F (discussing the need for increased transparency). 
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counterparts throughout the world,57 and, although many 
sources laud the extensive work of local governments with 
respect to adaptation,58 little attention has been focused on a 
troubling gap that exists between climate-related 
vulnerabilities and local preparedness. 
According to a survey administered by ICLEI in 2011, the 
United States has the lowest percentage of cities pursuing 
adaptation planning out of all regions surveyed (59%), while 
Latin American and Canadian cities have the highest (95% and 
92% respectively).59  Of particular concern, only 13% of the U.S. 
cities surveyed had even completed an assessment of their 
vulnerabilities and risks, the lowest percentage of all regions 
surveyed.60 
In its most recent assessment report, the IPCC identified a 
laundry list of potentially catastrophic risks (or “impacts”) 
consistent with the gap between vulnerability and local 
preparedness: 
 
Impacts from recent climate-related extremes, such as heat 
waves, droughts, floods, cyclones, and wildfires, reveal significant 
vulnerability and exposure of some ecosystems and many human 
systems to current climate variability (very high confidence).  
Impacts of such climate-related extremes include alteration of 
ecosystems, disruption of food production and water supply, 
damage to infrastructure and settlements, morbidity and 
mortality, and consequences for mental health and human well-
being.  For countries at all levels of development, these impacts 
are consistent with a significant lack of preparedness for current 
climate variability in some sectors.61 
 
In response to this vulnerability-preparedness gap, the IPCC 
highlights the importance of “city and municipal governments 
acting now to incorporate climate change adaptation into their 
development plans and policies and infrastructure 
 
57. ICLEI 2011 SURVEY, supra note 11.  
58. See, e.g., IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:  SYNTHESIS REPORT 107 (2014), available 
at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/A7WN-49YJ] (“There is a significant increase in the number of planned 
adaptation responses at the local level in rural and urban communities of developed 
and developing countries since the AR4.”). 
59. ICLEI 2011 SURVEY, supra note 11, at 14.  
60. Id. at 10.  
61. WGII SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 29, at 6.  
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investments,”62 characterizing “[a]ction in urban centers [as] 
essential to successful global climate change adaptation.”63 
This characterization of local government action as essential 
to disaster preparedness planning makes sense given that 
“[l]ocal land use authority is the foundation of the planning 
that determines how communities and natural resources are 
developed and preserved, and how disaster resilient 
communities are created.”64  As Patricia Salkin explains: 
 
Across the country, local governments maintain day-to-day 
responsibility and control over the use of the vast majority of 
lands that abut the nation’s edge and other environmentally 
sensitive areas.  Land use patterns are determined, 
infrastructure is designed and provided, and many other 
development issues are decided at the local level, where natural 
hazards are experienced and losses are suffered most directly.65 
 
Indeed, local governments have an array of tools in their 
toolbox that can help adapt their communities to climate 
change-related conditions including building codes; land use, 
zoning, and subdivision regulations; comprehensive, capital 
improvement, transportation, floodplain management, storm-
water management, and open space plans; facilities needs 
studies; population growth and future development studies; 
and economic development plans.66  Thus, it may not be 
surprising that a national survey of public and private 
emergency managers, code specialists, and engineers found 
 
62. Aromar Revi et al., Urban Areas, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:  IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 541 
(C.B. Field et al. eds., 2014), available at https://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/ 
WGIIAR5-Chap8_FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/ULJ9-LN64].  
63. Id. at 538; see also THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE U.S. MAYORS 
CLIMATE PROTECTION AGREEMENT 2 (2014) (adding new focus on urban resiliency), 
available at http://usmayors.org/climateagreement/Final%20USCM%202014%20 
Mayors%20Climate%20Protection%20Agreement.pdf [http://perma.cc/CNL4-8AWR]. 
64. John R. Nolon, Disaster Mitigation Through Land Use Strategies, 23 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 959, 976–77 (2006). 
65. Patricia Salkin, Sustainability at the Edge:  The Opportunity and Responsibility 
of Local Governments to Most Effectively Plan for Natural Disaster Mitigation, 38 
ENVT’L L.R. 10158, 10159 (2008). 
66. Id. at 10162–69 (discussing sustainability tools in local government toolbox). 
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that building codes and land use planning ranked as the most 
effective tool to achieve hazards vulnerability reduction.67 
Municipal regulation of the form and placement of building 
stock in particular offers an opportunity to create more 
resilient infrastructure and patterns of development; whereas, 
failure to proactively plan for climate change will result in 
further investment in infrastructure and patterns of 
development that, at best, fail to adapt to hazards, and, at 
worst, exacerbate hazards.  For example, law and policy 
makers must take a hard look at waterfront development plans 
and related regulations68 to assess whether development and 
rebuilding is being allowed or even encouraged in areas that 
are currently vulnerable or will become vulnerable within the 
life of the development, and whether the development is 
increasing the vulnerability of adjacent areas.  On a more 
mundane, but still significant level, structure elevation 
requirements should be amended to reduce the vulnerability of 
the structure throughout its entire useful life, not just for the 
next five, ten or twenty years.69  Relatedly, existing local zoning 
and building codes should be assessed to determine whether 
they impose requirements on the construction of elevated 
structures that increase local flood risk by, for example, 
increasing the impermeable surface area of the lot.70  Because 
 
67. Id. at 10158.  
68. See infra Part III.B. 
69. Many flood-prone communities rebuilding after a flood or storm surge event are 
requiring elevation of structures.  See, e.g., NEW YORK CITY BUILDING CODE 
(“NYCBC”), app. G, § 304.1.1 (2014), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dob/ 
apps/pdf_viewer/viewer.html?file=2014CC_BC_Chapter_1_Administration.pdf&section
=conscode_2014 [http://perma.cc/KCN8-V27C] (requiring 1–2 family residences be 
flood-proofed to 2 feet above Base Flood Elevation). 
70. For example, addition of lengthy switchback ramps and stairs needed to access 
an elevated first floor may increase the impermeable area of the structure.  See, e.g., id. 
at § 302.1.1 (requiring 30 feet of ramp for a 30 inch rise).  Depending on the amount of 
stairs or ramping required to access the elevated structure, the structure may need to 
be shifted back from the street, thereby occupying space that had previously been the 
backyard.  See, e.g., CITY OF NEW YORK, COASTAL CLIMATE RESILIENCY:  RETROFITTING 
BUILDINGS FOR FLUID RISK 42–43 (2014).  See also OREGON DEP’T OF LAND 
CONSERVATION, WATER QUALITY MODEL CODE AND GUIDE BOOK 4.44 (2000), available 
at http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/Pages/waterqualitygb.aspx [http://perma.cc/65HR-
8XVY] (discussing disruptions caused by building impervious surfaces in floodplains); 
Christopher P. Konrad, Effects of Urban Development on Floods, U.S. GEOLOGICAL 
SURVEY (Nov. 2003), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs07603/pdf/fs07603.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
Q73Q-LFBT]. 
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we can anticipate the addition of substantial new building 
stock and infrastructure over the next few decades, local 
governments that regulate the placement and, in some 
respects, design aspects of building stock have an opportunity 
to avoid locking in infrastructure that increases flood and other 
climate-related risks.71 
Indeed, given the clear role for local governments in 
adaptation planning and implementation,72 some scholars and 
commentators question whether local governments will soon 
face liability for failure to plan for and implement climate 
change adaptation measures.73  Because the consequences of 
destructive storms are foreseeable and at least in part 
attributable to failures in the legal system, Maxine Burkett 
argues that local governments could face tort liability for 
failure to adapt to climate change.74  She posits that although 
no affirmative duty exists for governments to provide 
protection from natural hazards, once a local government 
begins instituting adaptation measures, that action triggers a 
duty to adapt reasonably under the circumstances and failure 
to do so can result in liability for negligence.75 
 
71. John R. Nolon, The Land Use Stabilization Wedge Strategy:  Shifting Ground to 
Mitigate Climate Change, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 6 (2009) 
(reporting that sixty-six percent of the buildings in existence in the United States by 
the year 2050 are projected to be built between now and then).  
72. Id. 
73. See, e.g., Maxine Burkett, Duty and Breach in an Era of Uncertainty:  Local 
Government Liability for Failure to Adapt to Climate Change, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
775, 780–81 (2013).  
74. Id. at 780–81; see also Daniel Farber, Symposium Introduction:  Navigating the 
Intersection of Environmental Law and Disaster Law, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1783, 1786 
(2011) (“[E]nvironmental disasters stem from gaps in environmental regulation:  weak 
protection of wetlands, badly planned infrastructure, and, above all, climate 
change . . . .”).  
75. Burkett, supra note 73, at 780–81; see also Jenna Shweitzer, Climate Change 
Legal Remedies:  Hurricane Sandy and New York City Coastal Adaptation, 16 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 243, 246–47 (2014) (applying Maxine Burkett’s tort liability argument to 
New York City, concluding the City would not face liability for failure to adapt 
reasonably, and arguing that New York common law signals to local governments that 
property owners bear the risks of failure to adapt to natural hazards); Christopher 
Serkin, Passive Takings:  The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. 
REV. 345, 388–406 (2014) (arguing that regulatory failure to protect property in the 
face of climate change can amount to an unconstitutional taking); St. Bernard Parish 
Gov’t v. U.S., No. 05-1119L, 2015 WL 2058969, at *1 (Fed. Cl. May 1, 2015) (holding 
that U.S. Army Corps of Engineers failure to adequately maintain a flood protection 
system exacerbated flood damage from Hurricane Katrina and several subsequent 
  
448 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 40:3 
So far, in the United States, plaintiffs’ claims against local 
governments have not extended to negligent failure to adapt to 
climate change.  Rather, plaintiffs injured by flooding have 
brought actions against local governments alleging that the 
municipalities’ negligent design, construction, or operation of 
flood control structures caused the plaintiffs’ injuries,76 and, in 
at least one instance, plaintiffs injured by flooding brought an 
action against a county government claiming that the county’s 
negligent regulation of development on an adjacent property 
caused plaintiffs’ damages.77  With respect to the former 
actions, liability has tended to hinge on whether the 
municipality’s conduct was statutorily immune,78 and, if it was 
not, whether the plaintiffs proffered sufficient proof of 
negligence and causation.79  With respect to the latter action, 
the court held that the county owed no duty to homeowners to 
 
storms, and, although temporary, resulted in a taking of private property without just 
compensation in violation of the Takings Clause).  
76. See, e.g., Vermef v. City of Boulder City, 80 P.3d 445, 445 (Nev. 2003), abrogated 
by ASAP Storage, Inc. v. City of Sparks, 173 P.3d 734 (Nev. 2007); Walter Legge Co. v. 
City of Peekskill, 619 N.Y.S.2d 771, 771–72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
77. See, e.g., Cootey v. Sun Inv., Inc., 718 P.2d 1086, 1088–89 (Haw. 1986); see also 
Courtenay Thompson, Settlement Reached on the Capes, OREGONIAN, Dec. 24, 1999 
(reporting on settlement of lawsuit by homeowners against developers in a case 
resulting from houses dropping into the ocean and others being condemned as a result 
of erosion from waves). 
78. See, e.g., Vermef, 80 P.3d at 553 (ruling on appeal of summary judgment that 
city was not entitled to immunity for damages occurring during flood under statute 
immunizing government entities from liability arising out of emergency management 
activities where damage was due to pre-emergency installation of the drainage 
channel), abrogated by ASAP Storage, 80 P.3d at 744–45 (ruling that statute 
immunizing government from liability relating to emergency management activities 
creates immunity for emergency responses and emergency preparation activities); see 
also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that the government was immunized against claims for flooding damage); In re Katrina 
Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 802, 807 (E.D. La. 2008) (ruling that 
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether damage from flooding was caused 
by governmental negligence in design, construction, maintenance, and operation of a 
navigational channel, including resulting destruction of flood-mitigating wetlands, as 
opposed to negligence with regard to federal flood control project, which would be 
subject to statutory governmental immunity). 
79. Walter Legge Co., 210 A.D.2d at 317 (affirming order granting judgment as 
matter of law for city where there was insufficient proof of causation and negligence in 
action against city for damage to property allegedly caused by flooding when natural 
waterway used as part of municipal drainage system overflowed). 
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ensure that development of an adjoining subdivision would not 
create a risk of flooding the homeowners’ property.80 
II. NEW YORK CITY’S CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE INITIATIVES 
A. New York City and Climate Change:  The “New Normal”81 
Illustrating the “significant lack of preparedness for current 
climate variability”82 characteristic of the majority of U.S. 
cities,83 New York was dealt a massive, crippling blow by Super 
Storm Sandy on October 29, 2012.84  A number of 
idiosyncrasies—namely, timing, size and path—combined to 
make Sandy the City’s most extreme storm on record since 
1900 in terms of scale and scope of devastation and, arguably, 
surge height.85  The tidal surge flooded the New York Port 
Authority Trans-Hudson subway tunnels, the New York 
subways, and the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel86; 44 New Yorkers 
lost their lives87; 6,500 patients were evacuated from hospitals 
and nursing homes; nearly 90,000 buildings were in the 
 
80. Cootey, 718 P.2d at 1086. 
81. In the foreword to the PlaNYC 2013 Progress Report, Mayor Bloomberg 
lamented, “we are sobered by the ‘new normal’ that climate change is producing in our 
city, including more frequent and intense summer heat waves and more destructive 
coastal storms like Hurricane Sandy.”  CITY OF NEW YORK, PLANYC PROGRESS REPORT 
2013:  A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK 4 (2013) [hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT 2013], 
http://nytelecom.vo.llnwd.net/o15/agencies/planyc2030/pdf/planyc_progress_report_201
3.pdf [http://perma.cc/X4P3-9WAG]. 
82. WGII SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 29, at 6. 
83. See e.g., ICLEI 2011 SURVEY, supra note 11. 
84. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 40. 
85. Id. at 21.  But see STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 16 (arguing that Sandy’s 
surge height has been misreported as 14 feet at the Battery and that Sandy’s peak 
storm surge was actually 9 feet).  Sandy’s surge combined with high tide to produce 
flood levels of 14 feet above the mean lower low water line (“MLLW”) at the Battery, 
and 8.99 feet above the mean higher high water line (“MHHW”) at the Battery.  Id.; see 
also infra Part III.A (discussing the City’s narrative about the toughness of the storm 
versus the toughness of New Yorkers).  
86. Id. at 14. 
87. Stronger, More Resilient reported that the storm caused the death of 43 City 
residents.  STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 13.  This number was later 
changed to 44.  See ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 19.  The vast majority 
of the deaths were from drowning in areas where waters rose rapidly as a result of the 
storm surge.  Of these deaths, 23 occurred in Staten Island, including 10 in the 
neighborhood of Midland Beach, and the remainder occurred in Queens, Brooklyn and 
Manhattan.  Victims ranged in age from two years old to 90.  STRONGER, MORE 
RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 13–14. 
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inundation zone88; 1.1 million children were unable to attend 
school for a week89; nearly 2 million people were without 
power90; the storm shut down access to New York City by 
highway, rail and air for almost a week91; related power 
outages lasted for weeks in some areas92; and, the storm caused 
an estimated $19 billion in damage.93 
Severe storms and other climate-related impacts are 
expected to continue to manifest and increase in intensity as a 
result of the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere.94  
Cynthia Rosenzweig, co-chairperson of the second New York 
City Panel on Climate Change (“NPCC2”), identified 
“compelling areas of linkage between Super Storm Sandy and 
climate change, including rising sea levels that made storm 
surges higher.”95  Moreover, although scientists debate whether 
climate change caused Super Storm Sandy, scientists tend to 
agree that climate change contributed to the severity of the 
storm96 and will result in more extreme storms in the future.97  
As Strauss et al. of Climate Central observe: 
 
88. “More than 400 New York City Housing Authority buildings containing 
approximately 35,000 housing units lost power, heat, or hot water during Sandy.”  
STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 14. 
89. Id. at 11.  
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 17. 
92. Id. at 14. 
93. Id. at 11. 
94. See NEW YORK CITY PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 
2013:  OBSERVATIONS, CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTIONS, AND MAPS 15 (Cynthia 
Rosenzweig and William Solecki eds., 2013) [hereinafter “NPCC2”], http://www.nyc. 
gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/npcc_climate_risk_information_2013_report.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Q2GG-YTQB].  
95. Burkett, supra note 73, at 781 (citing Colin Sullivan, Columbia University Panel 
Urges Quick Action to Plan ‘Coastal City for the Future,’ CLIMATEWIRE (Nov. 20, 2012), 
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2012/11/20/archive/5?terms=colin+sullivan [http:// 
perma.cc/62B3-KFQM]).  
96. See NPCC2, supra note 94, at 7 (“While it is not possible to attribute any single 
extreme event such as Hurricane Sandy to climate change, sea level rise already 
occurring in the New York City area, in part related to climate change, increased the 
extent, and magnitude of coastal flooding during the storm.”). 
97. Id. at 8 (“Although hurricanes depend on a range of climate variables and it is 
not clear how all these variables will change, a number of recent studies suggest that 
the number of the most intense hurricanes may increase globally.  It is more likely 
than not that these hurricanes will also increase in the North Atlantic Basin.”) 
(internal footnote and citations omitted).  See also Cynthia Rosenzweig et al., Building 
the Knowledge Base for Climate Resiliency:  New York City Panel on Climate Change 
2015 Report, 1336 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 11 (2015) [hereinafter “NPCC 2015”], 
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[E]very coastal flood today is already wider, deeper and more 
damaging because of the roughly 8 inches (IPCC 2013) of 
warming-driven global sea level rise that has taken place since 
1900.  [Climate Central’s 2014] analysis finds that this rise has 
already increased the annual chance of extreme coastal floods in 
New York City by 50%.  Looking forward under a fast sea level 
rise scenario, [Climate Central] compute[s] a 3-in-4 chance of 
historically unprecedented coastal flooding in New York City by 
2100—or a 1-in-10 chance under a slow rise scenario.98 
 
By the 2080s, NPCC2’s projections suggest that sea level 
changes alone will “lead[] to . . . between a doubling and an 
approximately 10- to 15-fold increase in the frequency of the 
current 100-year coastal flood . . . .”99 
As a result of climate-related factors and land subsidence, 
sea level in New York City has risen 1.1 feet since 1900, 
approximately 1.2 inches per decade—a rate that is nearly two 
times the global average.100  According to NPCC2, an ongoing 
body established by New York City law to regularly update and 
report on region-specific climate data and projections, sea level 
rise is projected to accelerate as the century progresses, rising 
in New York City 11 to 21 inches by the 2050s, 18 to 39 inches 
by the 2080s, and as much as 6 feet by 2100 (over average 
2000–2005 levels).101 
 
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nyas.12591/epdf [http:// 
perma.cc/99B2-HZKH] (concluding that it is more likely than not that the number of 
intense hurricanes and the intensity of precipitation from these hurricanes will 
increase in the North Atlantic Basin).  NPCC 2015 presents the work of the NPCC 
from January 2013 to January 2015, which, among other things, documents recently 
observed climate trends and climate projections for the region up to 2100, compares the 
NPCC2 methods and projections to those done by AR5, provides new maps for 100- and 
500-year coastal flood events in the 2020s, 2050s, 2080s and 2100, incorporates 
analyses of public health issues, and sets forth a “process for developing a system of 
indicators and monitoring to track data related to climate change hazards, risks, 
impacts, and adaptation strategies.”  Id. at 9. 
98. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 11. 
99. NPCC 2015, supra note 97, at 11.  A “100-year coastal flood” is “a flood with a 
1% annual chance of occurrence” and a “500-year coastal flood” is a “flood with a 0.2% 
annual chance of occurrence.”  Id. at 9. 
100. NPCC2, supra note 94, at 8 (finding that approximately 45% of the observed 
sea level rise of 1.2 inches per decade since 1900 is due to land subsidence, with the 
remaining sea level rise driven by climate-related factors).  
101. NPCC 2015, supra note 97, at 11.  See also infra Part III.D (discussing the 
City’s robust, transparent, and science-based data collection, analysis and 
benchmarking initiatives).   
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To put these projections in perspective, consider that, with 
only a 1.5-foot sea level rise, another storm like Sandy could 
require New York City to evacuate as many as three million 
people.102  With a three-foot rise in sea level, major storms 
could inundate low-lying shore communities in Brooklyn, 
Queens, Staten Island, and Long Island, shut down the City’s 
transportation system, flood the highways, and render the 
tunnels into the City impassable.103  An even greater sea level 
rise, which appears possible by mid- to late-century given the 
continued pace of GHG emissions, “would place much of the 
city underwater—and beyond the reach of any protective 
measures.”104  Obviously, such conditions would cost lives, 
cause property damage and business losses, harm the 
environment and threaten public health.  In economic terms, 
former Mayor Bloomberg recently predicted, “while Sandy 
caused about $19 billion in losses for [New York City], rising 
sea levels and ocean temperatures mean that by the 2050s, a 
storm like Sandy could cause an estimated $90 billion in losses 
(in current dollars).”105 
Nor are storms and flooding the only, or even the worst, 
foreseeable effects of climate change on New York City.  
NPCC2 predicts that by 2050 the City could have as many days 
at or above ninety degrees annually as Birmingham, Alabama 
currently has.106  Heat waves are also predicted to more than 
triple in frequency and last on average one and a half times 
longer than they do today.107  Compounding this, heat indices 
are also projected to increase.108  “The combination of high 
temperatures and high humidity can produce severe additive 
 
102. The second NPCC report’s future flood maps illustrate how projected sea-level 
rises will expose additional areas of New York City to flooding during extreme storm 
events.  See NPCC2, supra note 94, at 25. 
103. Id.  
104. Bruce Stutz, New York City Girds Itself for Heat and Rising Seas, YALE ENV’T 
360 (Sept. 10, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2187 [http://perma.cc/ 
5UTE-5LRE] (discussing the results of the first NPCC report).  
105. Michael R. Bloomberg, Foreword to CITY OF NEW YORK, PLANYC:  A STRONGER, 
MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK 40 (June 2013), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
sirr/html/report/report.shtml [http://perma.cc/EF53-EJYN]. 
106. See NPCC2, supra note 94, at 20.  NPCC2 projects mean annual temperatures 
to increase by 4.1 to 5.7°F by the 2050s and by 5.3 to 8.8°F by the 2080s.  NPCC 2015, 
supra note 97, at 10.  
107. NPCC2, supra note 94, at 19. 
108. Id. at 22. 
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effects by restricting the human body’s ability to cool itself and 
thereby induce heat stress.”109  Given that heat waves kill more 
Americans each year than all other natural disasters 
combined,110 the need to address the causes of increasing 
temperatures and heat indices is great. 
Ultimately, NPCC2 concludes that “although there remain 
significant uncertainties regarding long-term climate change, 
the [most recent projections and analyses in the] NPCC 2015 
report support[] the large body of evidence indicating that 
decision-makers are better served by consideration of the 
future climate risks rather than reliance on the climate of the 
past in development of resiliency and rebuilding programs.”111 
B. New York City Takes a Comprehensive Approach to Climate 
Change 
Heeding the sobering data and dire predictions for its 
massive coastal population,112 New York City is taking a 
comprehensive approach to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. The City is collecting, analyzing and publishing 
climate change-related data and planning for more massive 
storm surges, heavy rains and winds, major heat waves and 
other extreme weather conditions.  The City is also taking 
numerous proactive steps to decrease GHG emissions and 
otherwise mitigate its contribution to climate change.113  What 
follows is a summary of some of the City’s key adaptation and 
mitigation initiatives.114 
 
109. Id.  
110. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 26. 
111. NPCC 2015, supra note 97, at 16.  
112. But see generally infra Part III (discussing whether New York City is taking 
sufficient resilience measures to protect its coastal population).  
113. Indeed, New York City is attacking climate change mitigation and resiliency 
from so many different angles that simply locating and navigating the different 
initiatives and challenges is a feat unto itself.  Initiatives not addressed in this article 
include, among others, the City’s air quality initiatives and Sustainable Stormwater 
Management Plan.  Reports on these initiatives and many others are available at the 
City’s Publications website.  See PlaNYC Publications, supra note 28.  
114. The City provides downloadable copies of more than a dozen reports on its 
sustainability initiatives, including benchmarking reports and reports on climate 
resilience.  See generally PlaNYC Home, MAYOR’S OFFICE OF RECOVERY & RESILIENCY, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/home/home.shtml [http://perma.cc/B6M4-JD6B] 
(last visited June 26, 2015). 
  
454 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 40:3 
1. Long-Term Comprehensive Sustainability Planning That 
Includes Climate Change Mitigation 
In 2007, Mayor Michael Bloomberg launched PlaNYC and 
the Mayor’s Office published a report entitled PlaNYC:  A 
Greener, Greater New York, which laid out the City’s long-term 
comprehensive sustainability goals, including the goal of 
reducing the City’s GHG emissions 30% below 2005 levels by 
2030 (“30 by 30”), and 126 initiatives to reach this and other 
goals, including the establishment of the Mayor’s Office of 
Long-Term Planning and Sustainability.115  In 2011, the City 
updated A Greener, Greater New York with new initiatives that 
placed an even greater emphasis on climate change resilience 
in response to weather changes that the City observed were 
already taking place.116  Following Super Storm Sandy, the 
City published A Stronger, More Resilient New York, which 
contained a comprehensive assessment of the City’s climate 
change vulnerabilities and a detailed adaptation and 
mitigation plan.117  In September 2014, Mayor de Blasio 
announced the formation of the new Mayor’s Office of Recovery 
and Resiliency and the City’s commitment to increase its GHG 
emissions-reduction target from 30% below 2005 levels by 2030 
(“30 by 30”) to 80% below 2005 levels by 2050 (“80 by 50”), in 
conjunction with publication of One City, Built to Last, a 
detailed plan for achieving two-thirds of the City’s additional 
CO2 emissions reductions through increases in building 
efficiency.118 
Since the publication of PlaNYC:  A Greener, Greater New 
York in 2007, the City has launched, among other things, the 
country’s first municipal brownfields cleanup program and an 
innovative green infrastructure program; implemented its 
Greener Greater Buildings Plan, Clean Heat program, climate 
resilience initiatives, Million Trees program and Green 
Infrastructure Plan; launched an ambitious suite of policies to 
reduce energy use in large buildings; passed regulations to 
 
115. See generally ICLEI PLANYC CASE STUDY, supra note 30, at 5 (evaluating New 
York City’s comprehensive long-term sustainability planning process). 
116. Numerous related New York City publications, including the 2007 and 2011 
Greener, Greater New York reports and annual progress reports are available at 
PlaNYC Publications, supra note 28.  
117. See STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7.  
118. See ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 20. 
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phase out highly polluting fuel oil; developed updated climate 
impact projections; and passed the City’s Zone Green Zoning 
Text amendment.119  The City has invested in a fleet of more 
than 600 plug-in electric vehicles and 153 charging stations, is 
testing electric taxis, is adding chargers to ten of its public 
parking lots, and passed a law in 2014 that requires 20% of 
new off street parking to be built “charger ready.”120  As a 
result of these and other measures, the City achieved a 19% 
reduction in GHG emissions from 2005 levels as of 2014.121 
2. Climate Change Resilience and Coastal Protection 
Planning 
New York City’s New Waterfront Revitalization Program 
(“local WRP” or “LWRP”), administered by the Department of 
City Planning (“DCP”), is the City’s principal coastal zone 
management tool.  In accordance with New York State’s WRP 
and the federal Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”), New 
York City adopted its first local WRP in 1982.122  The current 
LWRP policies were adopted by the City Council in 1999 in the 
“New Waterfront Revitalization Program,” and became 
effective upon state and federal approval in 2002.123  The City 
Council approved amendments to the 2002 LWRP in October 
2013, which will become effective upon approval by the New 
York State Department of State and concurrence by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce.  The LWRP currently in effect sets 
forth ten policies designed to maximize the benefits derived 
 
119. PROGRESS REPORT 2013, supra note 81, at 6. 
120. PROGRESS REPORT 2014, supra note 24, at 18. 
121. Id. at 51. 
122. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, THE NEW WATERFRONT 
REVITALIZATION PROGRAM 3 (2002) [hereinafter “NYC LWRP”], available at http:// 
www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/wrp/wrp_full.pdf [http://perma.cc/TEU9-8B8C].  New York 
City’s local waterfront revitalization plan (“WRP”) is authorized by New York State’s 
Waterfront Revitalization of Coastal Areas and Inland Waterways Act, N.Y. Exec. Law 
§§ 910–923 (2015), which stems from the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1451–1464 (2014).  The implementing regulations of the New York statute 
and coastal area policies can be found in the Department of State regulations, N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 600. 
123. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, THE NEW YORK CITY WATERFRONT 
REVITALIZATION PROGRAM:  NEW YORK CITY APPROVED REVISIONS PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 197-A OF THE CITY CHARTER 5 (2013) [hereinafter “NYC REVISED LWRP”], 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/wrp/revisions/nyc_wrp_city_approved.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/XT2P-PPNR] (discussing history of New York City’s LWRP and New LWRP). 
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from economic development, environmental preservation and 
public use of the waterfront, while minimizing the conflicts 
among those objectives.124  All city, state, and federal 
discretionary actions in the coastal zone must be reviewed for 
consistency with these policies.125  Notably, the 2002 LWRP’s 
objectives do not include coastal resilience and nowhere in the 
2002 LWRP is climate change or sea level rise discussed.  
However, on October 30, 2013, the City approved a series of 
revisions to its LWRP in order to advance the goals laid out in 
Vision 2020:  The New York City Comprehensive Waterfront 
Plan (“Vision 2020”),126 which is organized around eight goals, 
one of which is climate resilience.127  The revised LWRP is 
awaiting state and federal approval.128 
As part of PlaNYC, in December 2012, the City convened the 
Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency (“SIRR”) to 
address long-term climate change resilience specifically in the 
wake of Super Storm Sandy.129  Six months later, SIRR 
 
124. NYC LWRP, supra note 122, at 3. The ten policies address:  (1) residential and 
commercial redevelopment; (2) water-dependent and industrial uses; (3) commercial 
and recreational boating; (4) coastal ecological systems; (5) water quality; (6) flooding 
and erosion; (7) solid waste and hazardous substances; (8) public access; (9) scenic 
resources; and (10) historical and cultural resources.  Id. at 8.  
125. Id. at 3; see also infra Part III.B (discussing local, state and federal consistency 
review).  
126. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, VISION 2020:  NEW YORK CITY 
COMPREHENSIVE WATERFRONT PLAN 5 (March 2011) [hereinafter “VISION 2020”], 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/cwp/vision2020_nyc_cwp.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/MXZ6-Z96W]. 
127. NYC REVISED LWRP, supra note 123, at 6. The eight goals are:  expand public 
access, enliven the waterfront, support the working waterfront, improve water quality, 
restore the natural waterfront, enhance the Blue Network (the waterways themselves), 
improve governmental oversight, and increase climate resilience.  Id.  
128. The City Council approved the amendments to the revised LWRP on October 
30, 2013.  The revised LWRP will go into effect upon approval by the New York State 
Department of State and concurrence by the U.S. Department of Commerce.  See The 
Waterfront Revitalization Program—Approved by the City Council!  2012 WRP 
Revisions, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/ 
html/wrp/wrp_revisions.shtml [http://perma.cc/7G5M-GKHD] (last visited Apr. 20, 
2015) (describing approval process).  The public comment period for state approval 
closed on February 20, 2015.  Following approval by the state, the New York State 
Department of State will request incorporation of the City’s LWRP amendment into the 
State’s Coastal Management Program by the federal Office for Coastal Management.  
Id. 
129. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 3.  
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released A Stronger, More Resilient New York,130 and DCP 
released Designing for Flood Risk and Urban Waterfront 
Adaptive Strategies,131 each of which is relevant to the City’s 
waterfront management policies. 
The coastal protection chapter of A Stronger, More Resilient 
New York sets forth the City’s most recent comprehensive 
coastal protection plan.132  This plan reviews and rejects the 
“silver bullet” of a massive, harbor-wide storm-surge barrier, 
and instead proposes a broad range of discrete coastal 
protection measures.133  For example, the plan proposes the use 
of augmented wetlands, reefs and living shorelines in Jamaica 
Bay, Tottenville in Staten Island, Bay Ridge Flats, along the 
Arthur Kill and Kill van Kull, and along Long Island Sound.  
The plan also recommends the use of hard armoring (i.e., 
protective infrastructures), including local storm surge barriers 
in Newtown Creek, Rockaway Inlet and the Gowanus Canal in 
Brooklyn.  These barriers would consist of large, movable in-
water gates connected to levees or floodwalls on adjacent 
shores.134  Although the report notes that “ultimately the City 
will be best served by implementing the entire suite of options,” 
the report claims that implementation of the thirty-seven 
“Phase I” measures could reduce expected losses in a Sandy-
 
130. A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK is a 438-page, 22-chapter report 
presenting recommendations for rebuilding the communities affected by Sandy and 
increasing the resilience of infrastructure and buildings citywide.  Gathering data from 
numerous sources, including the NPCC2 report and an economic analysis by the 
reinsurance company Swiss Re, the 2013 report projected that, absent implementation 
of the SIRR recommendations, by 2050, a storm similar to Sandy would cost New York 
City approximately five times as much as Sandy, or $90 billion.  Id. at 34.  
131. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, DESIGNING FOR FLOOD RISK (June 2013), 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/sustainable_communities/designing_ 
flood_risk.pdf [http://perma.cc/C5JT-HJTG]; N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, URBAN 
WATERFRONT ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES (June 2013), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
dcp/pdf/sustainable_communities/urban_waterfront_print.pdf [http://perma.cc/DQG8-
GZWB]. 
132. See STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 50.  
133. Id. at 50–65. 
134. Id. at 56.  The SIRR report also contains six initiatives designed to strengthen 
the City’s ability to understand the impacts of climate change, id. at 32, fourteen 
initiatives to increase the resilience of the City’s buildings, id. at 79–86, six economic 
recovery initiatives, id. at 89–90, ten initiatives for addressing the needs of the 
insurance system, id. at 101–03, and twenty-three initiatives for increasing the 
resiliency of utilities, id. at 122–29. 
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like storm in the 2050s by up to twenty-five percent, or more 
than $22 billion.135 
The reports released by DCP in June 2013, Designing for 
Flood Risk and Urban Waterfront Adaptive Strategies, are 
intended to help New York City and other urban waterfront 
communities improve their resilience to coastal flood risks.136  
Designing for Flood Risk identifies design principles to guide 
flood-resistant construction, provides an overview of regulatory 
requirements for construction in flood zones under the National 
Flood Insurance Program, recommends changes to zoning to 
“enable more versatile and desirable design solutions for flood-
resistant construction,” and “explores the impacts of flood-
resistant construction standards on built form and the creation 
of a vibrant streetscape and public realm.”137  Urban 
Waterfront Adaptive Strategies identifies and analyzes 
potential adaptive strategies, including interventions inland, at 
the shoreline, and in the water.138  Both of these DCP reports 
informed A Stronger, More Resilient New York.139  Designing 
for Flood Risk also shaped the DCP’s Flood Resilience Text 
Amendment.140 
3. Local-Scale Climate Models and Risk Analysis 
To help respond to climate change in New York City and 
accomplish the goals outlined in PlaNYC, the Mayor’s Office 
convened the first New York City Panel on Climate Change 
(“NPCC1”) in 2008.141  In doing this, New York City became the 
first city to scale down the United Nations’ IPCC global climate 
models to develop climate-related projections specific to a 
municipality.142  In 2009, NPCC1 released a set of climate 
projections specific to New York City.  Significantly, but 
 
135. Id. at 40. 
136. See DESIGNING FOR FLOOD RISK, supra note 131, at 10–11; URBAN 
WATERFRONT ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 131, at iii.  
137. See DESIGNING FOR FLOOD RISK, supra note 131, at 32. 
138. See URBAN WATERFRONT ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 131, at 3. 
139. See, e.g., STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 47, 82. 
140. See infra Part II.B.5 (summarizing Flood Resilience Text Amendment).  
141. Michael R. Bloomberg et al., Climate Change Adaptation in New York City:  
Building a Risk Management Response, 1196 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1 (2010). 
142. IPCC, the international advisory body on climate change, was formed in 1988 
by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment 
Programme.  See NPCC2, supra note 94, at 34. 
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unsurprisingly, NPCC1 concluded that, despite efforts to 
reduce GHG emissions, New York City must make substantial 
preparations for climate-related changes.143 
In September 2012, the City passed Local Law 42, which 
established the New York City Panel on Climate Change as an 
ongoing body.144  Local Law 42 requires the NPCC to meet at 
least twice a year to review scientific data on climate change; 
recommend projections for the 2020s, 2050s, and 2080s within 
one year of the publication of the IPCC Assessment Reports, or, 
at a minimum once every three years; recommend a framework 
for stakeholders to incorporate climate change projections into 
their planning processes; and advise the City’s Office of Long-
Term Planning and Sustainability on a communications 
strategy related to climate science.145 
Local Law 42 also established a New York City climate 
change adaptation task force, “consisting of city, state and 
federal agencies and private organizations and entities 
responsible for developing, maintaining, operating or 
overseeing the city’s public health, natural systems, critical 
infrastructure, buildings and economy.”146  Like the NPCC, the 
task force is required to meet at least twice a year, and, within 
one year of the NPCC’s development of recommended climate 
change projections pursuant to Local Law 42, the task force 
must create an inventory of potential climate change-related 
risks.147 
In January 2013, the Mayor’s Office convened the second 
New York City Panel on Climate Change (“NPCC2”) to provide 
scientific information and analyses on climate risks for use in 
 
143. NPCC, CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 5 (2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/om/pdf/2009/NPCC_CRI.pdf [http://perma.cc/AHN8-MAXA]. 
144. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-122–3-123. 
145. Id.  
146. Id. 
147. Id.  The task force is also responsible for reviewing the NPCC’s climate change 
projections, evaluating potential impacts of climate change on public health, including 
delivery of public health services to the city’s vulnerable populations; evaluating the 
potential impacts of climate change on the city’s natural systems, critical 
infrastructure and buildings; identifying rules, policies and regulations governing 
public health, natural systems, critical infrastructure, buildings and economy that may 
be affected by climate change; and formulating and updating coordinated strategies to 
address the potential impact of climate change on the city’s communities, vulnerable 
populations, public health, natural systems, critical infrastructure, buildings and 
economy.  Id. 
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the SIRR.148  Specifically, the goal of NPCC2 was to “present 
climate uncertainties clearly in order to facilitate risk-based 
decision-making on the use of policy tools such as incentives, 
regulations, and insurance” in order to “make New York City 
more resilient to mean changes in climate and to future 
extreme events.”149  NPCC2 published reports in June 2013 
and February 2015, which provided new climate change 
projections and future coastal flood risk maps for New York 
City.150 
4. NYC Green Codes Task Force 
In July 2008, Mayor Bloomberg and City Council Speaker 
Christine Quinn asked the New York Chapter of the U.S. 
Green Building Council (“USGBC”) to convene the NYC Green 
Codes Task Force to review the City’s building and 
construction codes and make recommendations on how they 
could be amended to promote more sustainable practices.  The 
task force was asked, among other things, to examine 
construction, fire, water and sewer and zoning codes; identify 
impediments to the incorporation of green technologies; 
identify opportunities to promote energy efficiency and other 
sustainable practices; and recommend ways to incorporate 
climate adaptation measures into the codes.151 
The task force’s more than 200 volunteers152 responded with 
111 proposed initiatives, consisting primarily of code additions 
or revisions.153  Nine additional recommendations were 
 
148. NPCC2, supra note 94, at 7; see also supra Part II.B.1.  
149. NPCC2, supra note 94, at 9. 
150. Id. at 4; NPCC 2015 supra note 97, at 9–10. 
151. Letter from Michael Bloomberg, Mayor, and Christine Quinn, Speaker of the 
Council of the City of New York, to Russell Unger, Executive Director, USGBC New 
York (July 8, 2008), in URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, NYC GREEN CODES TASK FORCE:  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2010) [hereinafter “NYC GREEN CODES”], available at http:// 
www.nyc.gov/html/gbee/downloads/pdf/gctf_executive_summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
S7HA-FBTF]. 
152. The volunteers consisted of “architects; engineers; lighting, landscape 
architects and interior designers; owners and developers; corporate tenants; 
contractors; cost estimators; affordable-housing experts; code specialists; attorneys; 
waste haulers; scientists and public-health experts; and representatives of 
environmental organizations, building trade unions, city agencies, and industry and 
professional associations.”  NYC GREEN CODES, supra note 151, at 3.  
153. See GCTF Enacted Proposals, PLANYC, http://www.nyc.gov/html/gbee/html/ 
codes/enacted.shtml [http://perma.cc/7F8D-R8SH] (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (listing 
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introduced as bills in the City’s 2014 legislative session.154  
Each proposed code amendment or revision includes proposed 
statutory language, a detailed explanation of the issues, an 
analysis of costs and savings, precedents from other 
jurisdictions, a comparison of the proposal to any related 
Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design (“LEED”) 
credits and information on implementation.155  The proposals 
primarily affect new buildings under construction and existing 
buildings that are being renovated, but, in some cases, the 
proposals focus on upgrading existing buildings.156 
As of April 2015, 52 of the 111 proposals had been 
implemented and another 4 had been partially implemented.157  
The enacted codes include new laws or amendments to existing 
law that: (1) add environmental protection as a fundamental 
principle of construction codes,158 (2) streamline approvals for 
green technologies and projects,159 (3) increase resiliency of 
buildings to natural disasters,160 (4) increase energy 
efficiency161 and decrease carbon emissions,162 (5) remove 
 
enacted and partially enacted proposals, corresponding legal language, and links to the 
proposals).  
154. PROGRESS REPORT 2014, supra note 24, at 20.  
155. See, e.g., URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, NYC GREEN CODES TASK FORCE:  FULL 
PROPOSALS OC1-1–3 (2010) [hereinafter “NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS”], available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/gbee/downloads/pdf/gctf_all_proposals.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
U49A-LBYX]. 
156. See, e.g., id. at OC3-1 (proposing amendment to building code to require all 
buildings to comply with improved environmental and health standards); 2009 N.Y.C. 
Local Law No. 85 (enacting the proposed amendment to require all buildings to comply 
with improved environmental and health standards). 
157. See NYC Green Codes Proposal Tracker, URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, http://urban 
greencouncil.org/greencodestracker [http://perma.cc/8CX5-NLNN] (last visited Apr. 20, 
2015) (providing status of all 111 proposal and links to applicable legislation, local 
laws, and the proposal).  
158. 2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 49. 
159. 2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 5. 
160. See, e.g., NYCBC, app. G; 2013 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 143 (improving 
safeguards for toxic materials stored in flood zones); 2013 NYC Local Law No. 81 
(studying and forecasting non-flood climatic hazards to 2080); 2013 N.Y.C., Local Law 
79 (ensuring toilets and sinks can operate during blackouts). 
161. See, e.g., 2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 52 (improving lighting efficiency in 
apartment buildings); 2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 48 (regarding manual on-automatic 
off lighting); 2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 47 (regarding the reduction of artificial 
lighting in sunlit lobbies and hallways). 
162. See, e.g., 2011 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 21 (reducing summer heat with cool roofs); 
2013 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 141 (reducing carbon dioxide emissions from specialized 
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impediments to alternative energy,163 (6) increase indoor health 
and safety,164 (7) increase resource conservation,165 (8) manage 
stormwater more sustainably,166 (9) promote sustainable urban 
ecological practices,167 and (10) enhance water efficiency.168 
5. Zoning Code Amendments 
Building on the work of the Green Codes Task Force, on April 
30, 2012, the City Council adopted the Zone Green Text 
Amendment,169 which amended the City’s Zoning Resolution for 
the stated purpose of removing impediments to the 
construction and retrofitting of greener buildings.170  The Zone 
Green amendments were one of a series of Zoning Resolution 
amendments the DCP proposed to promote sustainable 
communities and climate change resilience.  This series of 
amendments also included a Flood Resilience Text 
 
concrete); 2010 ECCCNYS ch. 5 and ASHRAE 90.1 2010 ch. 5 (minimizing air leakage 
building exteriors); 1 R.C.N.Y. ch. 5000 (ensuring lighting systems function properly). 
163. See, e.g., 63 R.C.N.Y. 1 (removing landmarks impediments to alternative 
energy); 2011 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 20 (allowing large solar rooftop installations); 2012 
N.Y.C. Local Law No. 28 (increasing allowable size of solar shades); 2010 N.Y.C. Local 
Law No. 43 (allowing use of biofuels).  
164. See, e.g., 2012 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 2 (limiting harmful emissions from 
carpets); 2011 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 71 (requiring the filtering of soot from incoming 
air); 15 R.C.N.Y. ch. 2 (phasing out dirty boiler fuels); 2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 43 
(phasing out dirty boiler fuels); 2011 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 20 (treating corrosive 
concrete wastewater); 15 R.C.N.Y. ch. 1 (reducing “red tape” for asbestos removal); 
2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 55 (increasing availability of drinking fountains).  In 
addition, the Federal Formaldehyde Standards for Composite Wood Products Act 
enacted in 2010 restricts cancer-causing formaldehyde in building materials.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 2697 (West 2010). 
165. See, e.g., 2012 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 60 (providing recycling areas in apartment 
buildings); 2011 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 71 (requiring use of recycled asphalt). 
166. See, e.g., 15 R.C.N.Y. ch. 31 (strengthening stormwater run-off management 
requirements for new developments). 
167. See, e.g., 2013 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 80 (constructing sustainable sidewalks). 
168. See, e.g., 2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 57 (enhancing water efficiency standards); 
2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 56 (catching leaks by measuring water use); 2010 N.Y.C. 
Local Law No. 54 (stopping wasting drinking water for cooling). 
169. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G, ZONE GREEN TEXT AMENDMENT (enacted Apr. 30, 
2012), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/greenbuildings/adopted_text_ 
amendment.pdf [http://perma.cc/E9S9-DKUP]. 
170. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G, ZONE GREEN TEXT AMENDMENT HANDOUT 1, 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/greenbuildings/handout.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/KA2P-ULJN] (last visited June 26, 2015). 
  
2015] Sink or Swim 463 
Amendment, which the City adopted on October 9, 2013.171  
The Flood Resilience amendments removed barriers to 
constructing and retrofitting for flood resilience based on the 
latest flood maps issued by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (“FEMA”).172  The amendments also put 
in place measures to mitigate the potential negative effects of 
elevated buildings on ground-floor activity and quality of the 
streetscape.173  The City also adopted numerous sustainability-
related amendments to its Zoning Resolution prior to and 
separate from the Zone Green and Flood Resilience 
amendments.  These include amendments that allow car share 
vehicles to park in off-street parking garages and lots in certain 
locations174; require indoor, secure, long-term bicycle parking in 
new multi-family residential, community facility, and 
commercial buildings175; require street tree planting for all new 
developments and major enlargements citywide176; and prevent 
excessive paving of front yards by encouraging landscaping and 
planting of yards.177 
III. NEW YORK CITY: A MODEL FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
RESILIENCE? 
PlaNYC is far from merely aspirational—it contains concrete 
goals such as the 2050 emissions reduction goal and interim 
emissions reductions goals, specific implementation strategies, 
substantial data analyses projects, an aggressive timeline for 
making changes to relevant local laws, and funding strategies.  
PlaNYC’s 2013 progress report boasts that “PlaNYC is the 
world’s standard for municipal sustainability plans and cities 
 
171. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G., FLOOD RESILIENCE TEXT AMENDMENT, available 
at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/flood_resiliency/final_text.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
A7E2-UWYM] (last visited Mar. 22, 2015). 
172. Id. at § 12–10. 
173. Id. at § 64-00(c). 
174. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G. ZONING RESOLUTION AMENDMENT (adopted Sept. 
29, 2010), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/zone/allarticles.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/B9V3-KH6X].  
175. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G. ZONING RESOLUTION AMENDMENT, N 090191 
ZRY, § 11-337 (adopted Apr. 22, 2009). 
176. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G, ZONING RESOLUTION AMENDMENT, N 080081 
ZRY, § 11-336 (adopted Apr. 30, 2008). 
177. Id. 
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throughout the world are emulating our work.”178  
Notwithstanding significant tensions and challenges, this boast 
appears to hold water, at least with respect to communications 
and public involvement; data analysis, collection and 
transparency; vulnerability assessment; building efficiency 
improvements; and development of action-focused plans with 
concrete implementation strategies including funding 
strategies.179  Despite proactive and laudable policies, the boast 
does not hold water, however, with respect to emissions 
reductions commitments and coastal zone policies that fail to 
fully account for likely near- and medium-term future 
hazards—key features of mitigation and adaptation, 
respectively. 
Thus, a number of New York City initiatives, as well as their 
underlying planning processes, provide excellent models for 
regional, county and sub-county level resilience planning 
efforts.  Other of the initiatives take important steps, some of 
which are unprecedented in the United States, but 
nevertheless fall short of what is likely required to sufficiently 
“moderate[] harm” from dangerous interference with the 
climate system.180 
 
178. PROGRESS REPORT 2013, supra note 81, at 6. 
179. See generally ICLEI PLANYC CASE STUDY, supra note 30, at  7.  In 2010, ICLEI 
selected PlaNYC as the model for its Sustainability Five Milestone process “because of 
the comprehensive scope of the plan, the extensive planning process the City undertook 
to analyze issues, and the broad public outreach performed by the City to more than 70 
stakeholder groups.”  Id. at 9.  The Milestones are as follows:  conduct a sustainability 
assessment, establish sustainability goals, develop a local sustainability plan, 
implement policies and measures, and evaluate progress and report results.  Id.  ICLEI 
identified the following as factors that contributed to the success of the plan, inter alia:   
 
a methodical, transparent, and inclusive planning process[; c]entral management 
and coordination[; a]n external Sustainability Advisory Board . . . [; a] 
comprehensive public outreach process [that] generated broad public support and 
helped to educate the general public about climate change and sustainability 
issues . . . [; t]he plan included an implementation plan with a timeline and a 
funded budget[; and s]wift transition from planning to action.   
 
Id. at 6.  
180. See AR4 WGII, supra note 7, at 6 (defining “adaptation”); see also supra note 13 
(quoting same). 
  
2015] Sink or Swim 465 
A. PlaNYC:  A Persuasive Narrative About a Climate Resilient 
Future 
To the extent “good planning [is] persuasive storytelling 
about the future,”181 New York City is doing good resilience 
planning.  The post-Sandy report, Stronger, More Resilient, 
tells a persuasive story of toughness and unity.  Threaded 
throughout A Stronger, More Resilient New York are messages 
about the strength, toughness and machismo of New Yorkers: 
 
The underlying goal of this report is resiliency.  That is, to adapt 
our city to the impacts of climate change and to seek to ensure 
that, when nature overwhelms our defenses from time to time, 
we are able to recover more quickly. 
 
In short, we have to be tough. 
 
And toughness, as we all know, is one of the defining traits of 
New Yorkers. 
 
In just the first few years of this century, we have been through 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, financial crises and 
blackouts, and now, Sandy.  With each challenge, we have 
become more united as a city. 
 
We must come together again with an even stronger commitment 
to slow the progress of climate change while simultaneously 
preparing for the changes already evident around us—and those 
yet to come. 
 
If we embrace this plan today, we will be positioned to meet the 
challenges that climate change may bring tomorrow, and almost 
certainly will bring in the years and decades ahead.  If we take 
action now, we will make New York City stronger, safer, and 
more resilient—not only for our own benefit, but for the benefit of 
future generations of New Yorkers. 
 
181. Estiri, supra note 36, at 6 (quoting James A. Throgmorton, Planning as 
Persuasive Storytelling About the Future:  Negotiating an Electric Power Rate 
Settlement in Illinois, 12 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 17 (1992)).  See also James A. 
Throgmorton, Planning as Persuasive Storytelling in the Context of “the Network 
Society,” Presentation at the ACSP-AESOP Third Joint Congress, Leuven, Belgium 
(July 8–12,2003), available at http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005 
&context=urban_pubs [http://perma.cc/WH26-CH2U] (responding to criticism of claim 
that planning is persuasive storytelling and citing other recent treatments of 
storytelling in planning).  
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The time has come to make our city even tougher.182 
 
The new administration carries the toughness theme forward 
with its tag line, “One City, Built to Last,” reminiscent of Ford 
Truck’s 1990s ad campaigns (“Built to Last” and “Built Ford 
Tough”).183  The underlying message appears to be that “tough 
guys” care about climate change, and, ultimately, New 
Yorkers—at least if they get on board with the City’s 
initiatives—are tougher than climate change.  Illustrative of 
this, A Stronger, More Resilient New York includes a definition 
of “resilient,” which lists as synonyms “New York City” and 
“TOUGH.”184 
Given systemic climate change denial,185 paralysis at the 
federal level,186 and a troubling lack of preparedness in the 
 
182. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 6.  The toughness theme is also 
reinforced through images.  See, e.g., id. at 6. 
183. See ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16; see also Tanya Gazdik, Ford 
Boosts Ad Spending Behind Jwt’s ‘Built To Last’ Campaign, ADWEEK (Feb. 9, 1998, 
12:00 AM), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising/ford-boosts-ad-spending-behind-
jwts-built-last-campaign-23668 [http://perma.cc/7HN8-KUU8] (discussing introduction 
of “Built to Last” tagline, to be used in conjunction with “Built Ford Tough” tag line). 
184. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 2. 
185. See Global Trends, IPSOS MORI (2014), http://www.ipsosglobaltrends.com/ 
environment.html [http://perma.cc/V2JP-ZK8E] (finding in a September/October 
survey that only 54% of Americans believe “[t]he climate change we are currently 
seeing is largely the result of human activity”).  The American response to this 
question (54%) was 10 points lower than the second lowest percentage of the 20 
countries surveyed.  Id.  Similarly, an Associated Press-GfK poll found only 33% of 
Americans were “extremely confident” that the average temperature of the world is 
rising due to the existence of heat-trapping greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere.  GFK 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS & CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS, THE AP-GFK POLL 2 (2014) available 
at http://ap-gfkpoll.com/main/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/AP-GfK-March-2014-Poll-
Topline-Final_SCIENCE.pdf [http://perma.cc/ME5P-3F7H]; see also Lydia Saad, In 
U.S., Global Warming Views Steady Despite Warm Winter (Mar. 30, 2012), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/153608/global-warming-views-steady-despite-warm-
winter.aspx [http://perma.cc/4A45-DB4L] (reporting on Gallup annual environmental 
poll in which 42% of respondents said reports of climate change are exaggerated); Peter 
J. Jacques et al., The Organisation of Denial:  Conservative Think Tanks and 
Environmental Scepticism, 17 ENVTL. POL. 349, 349 (2008) (linking environmental 
skepticism fostered by conservative think tanks to a weakening of US commitment to 
environmental policies).  Even more troubling, some states are restricting local 
government’s ability to pass laws or implement policies on climate change.  See, e.g., 
Tristram Korten, In Florida, Officials Ban Term ‘Climate Change,’ FL. CTR. FOR 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Mar. 8, 2015), http://fcir.org/2015/03/08/in-florida-officials-
ban-term-climate-change/ [http://perma.cc/BA8H-CFK6] (discussing unwritten Florida 
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United States,187 the persuasive power of a municipality’s 
climate change plan should be considered when assessing the 
plan’s effectiveness.  Dan Kahan has urged that 
communication at the local level that is consistent with “the 
path of least resistance” is not only pragmatic, but is in fact 
“morally right.”188  He argues that discussions at the local level 
are sufficiently removed from the divisive language of the 
national debate “and sufficiently proximate to other meaning-
pervaded domains . . . to evoke a host of different 
associations.”189 Thus, he asserts that, at the local level, 
citizens are “speaking in idioms—ones relating to their shared 
historical experience, for instance, as people either battered by 
violent storms or baked by arid, scorching heat—the familiarity 
and logic of which predate climate change.”190 
Certainly, the City’s use of a toughness theme appears to 
evoke the shared experience of survival and, as a result, the 
need for action separate from any politicized discussion of 
climate change.  Referencing the “September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks, financial crises and blackouts,” the City’s resiliency 
plan draws on these experiences of extreme hardship and 
survival, asserting that “[w]ith each challenge, we have become 
more united as a city” and urging New Yorkers to “come 
together again with an even stronger commitment to slow the 
progress of climate change while simultaneously preparing for 
the changes already evident around us—and those yet to 
come.”191  This narrative of toughness may be more than just a 
public relations device; rather, the narrative, by evoking a 
shared experience that predates debate on climate change, may 
increase public acceptance of the City’s resilience and 
 
policy prohibiting state officials from using the term “climate change” or “global 
warming” in official communications, emails, or reports). 
186. See infra Part III.F.2, discussing the lack of federal congressional support of 
state and local climate resilience initiatives, noting federal executive actions in this 
area, and discussing the need for integration across the local, state and federal levels.   
187. See infra notes 395–08 (discussing ICLEI 2011 Survey showing that percentage 
of U.S. municipalities to have completed adaptation assessments is lower than any 
other region surveyed).  
188. Dan M. Kahan, Cognitive Bias and the Constitution, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 367, 
408 (2013). 
189. Id. at 407. 
190. Id.  
191. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 6.  The toughness theme is also 
reinforced through images.  See, e.g., id.  
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mitigation plans, and indeed may be a lynchpin in their 
success.192  But, is it “morally right,” as Kahan urges, to take 
the path of least resistance193 when doing so involves a failure 
to correct public misperception of the scope of the crisis? 
Data and projections from the IPCC, NPCC2 and other 
scientists tell us that climate change itself is tough and getting 
tougher with each passing day.194  Thus, although the City is 
undertaking adaptation and mitigation planning and 
implementation initiatives, many of which are unprecedented 
in the United States, the City’s “toughness” message may have 
the unintended, and potentially significant, harmful 
consequence of giving New Yorkers a false assurance of 
preparedness and lack of vulnerability.  This may be especially 
so because the toughness message has been combined with a 
narrative that paints Super Storm Sandy as an anomaly.  By 
referring to Sandy as “the worst natural disaster ever to hit 
New York City,”195 the Mayor’s Office may give the mistaken 
impression that the storm was both unprecedented and a true 
worst-case-scenario—when, in fact, a storm of Sandy’s 
magnitude is not unprecedented in the region, and a different 
set of circumstances could have made Sandy even more 
devastating than it was.196  Since 1900, New York City has 
experienced storms with higher winds speeds,197 more rain,198 
and peak surges ten feet or higher above mean low tide,199 
which, if they hit the City today would have even higher peak 
 
192. See id. at 408 (“[I]nsistence [that the divisive meanings of the national climate 
change debate be engrafted onto the local adaptation one] has wrecked attempts to 
replicate in North Carolina a constructive form of political engagement with climate 
science now unfolding in states like Florida and Virginia.”).  
193. Kahan, supra note 188, at 408. 
194. See supra Part II.A. 
195. See Bloomberg, supra note 105. 
196. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 21. 
197. See id.  (“[Sandy’s] 80- mile-per-hour (“mph”) peak wind gusts fell well short of 
other storms that have hit New York City, including Hurricane Carol in 1954 (up to 
125-mph gusts) and Hurricane Belle in 1976 (up to 95-mph gusts).”).  
198. Id.  (“Previous storms also brought much more rain with them.  Sandy dropped 
a scant inch in some parts of New York, far less than the 5 inches of rain dropped on 
the city during Hurricane Donna in 1960 or the 7.5 inches during the April 2007 
nor’easter.”).  
199. See id. at 21 (discussing 1821 hurricane (13-foot storm surge) and Hurricane 
Donna in 1960 (10-foot storm surge)). 
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surges as a result of rising sea levels.200  Moreover, although 
circumstances combined to increase Sandy’s devastation, 
Sandy itself was not a worst-case scenario.  For example, had 
Sandy struck at high tide in Western Long Island Sound, as 
opposed to near high tide at the Battery, Swiss Re projects that 
Sandy’s peak surge would have been four feet higher than it 
was.201 
Thus, although potentially effective as communication 
strategies to garner support of a plan, narratives of toughness 
combined with characterizations of Sandy as an anomalous 
worst-case-scenario, especially combined with the City’s 
voluminous and numerous reports on climate resilience 
planning, could lead the public to conclude that their local 
government has the problem under control.  In addition to 
likely being incorrect,202 this perception could lead residents 
and business owners to overlook opportunities to contribute to 
climate change adaptation (by, for example, installing flood 
mitigation measures on their own property) and mitigation (by, 
for example, making significant lifestyle changes to reduce 
personal energy usage), or make choices that increase their 
own or the City’s future vulnerability (by, for example, 
purchasing property in a flood zone or rebuilding a structure 
with a 80-year useful life based on 10-year sea level rise 
projections).203 
B. The Super Wicked Problem of Waterfront Development 
Public policy scholars characterize as “wicked problem[s]” 
policy problems that defy resolution because of “enormous 
interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting 
stakeholders implicated by any effort to develop a solution.”204  
Climate change generally, and the policy conundrum faced by 
 
200. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 11 (noting that storms today are intensified in 
terms of surge height and other variables as a result of higher sea levels).  
201. See STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 21 (describing projected 
impacts under a western Long Island Sound high tide scenario). 
202. See supra Part II.A, infra Part III.C (discussing sea level rise and related 
projections and likely insufficient mitigation to stay within a 2°C pathway). 
203. See generally infra Part III.B (discussing continued waterfront development in 
highly vulnerable areas; see also infra note 207 (discussing specific examples of 
waterfront development in known risk areas).  
204. See Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:  
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2009).  
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municipalities’ regulation of waterfront development in 
particular, poses a “super wicked problem.”205  In addition to 
obvious economic and political obstacles posed by policies that 
involve displacement of residents and businesses and 
devaluation of property, major changes in waterfront 
development policies also must overcome particularly wicked 
obstacles related to the complex intergovernmental web of 
laws, regulations and agencies that regulate waterfront areas. 
To highlight the wickedness of the waterfront development 
problem, consider the repeated dire projections for vulnerable 
coastal areas206; continued development of these areas, 
including publicly funded development207; the devastation of 
these areas during Sandy and other extreme weather events, 
including loss of lives, displacement of thousands of residents 
and businesses, and massive property and infrastructure 
losses208; and political assurances post-Sandy that New Yorkers 
are “tougher”209 than climate change and, without question, 
“we’ll rebuild it.”210  Indeed, at the same time as the City was 
publishing warnings about accelerating sea level rise and 
increasing risk from floods and storm surge, the City also 
reported in its Clean Waterfront Plan that “New Yorkers are 
taking advantage of the waterfront for recreation, housing, and 
 
205. Id. at 1159–60 (arguing that climate change is a “super wicked problem”).  
206. See, e.g., NPCC 2015, supra note 97, at 41 (high estimate projection of sea level 
rise of 6.25 feet over a 2000 to 2004 base period by the century’s end); Burkett, supra 
note 73, at 782 n.46 (citing New York and New Jersey master plans and reports 
predicting the growing dangers from continued development).  
207. See John Rudolf et al., Hurricane Sandy Damage Amplified by Breakneck 
Development of Coast, HUFF. POST (Nov. 12, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2012/11/12/hurricane-sandy-damage_n_2114525.html [http://perma.cc/VCA8-
3TS4] (“On Staten Island, developers built more than 2,700 mostly residential 
structures in coastal areas at extreme risk of storm surge flooding between 1980 and 
2008, with the approval of city planning and zoning authorities, according to a review 
of city building data by scientists at the College of Staten Island.  Some of this 
construction occurred in former marshland along the island’s Atlantic-facing south 
shore.”). 
208. See Sarah Adams-Schoen, On the Waterfront:  New York City’s Climate Change 
Adaptation and Mitigation Challenge, Part 1, 25 ENVTL. L. N.Y. 81, 82–83 (2014). 
209. See supra Part III.A (discussing PlaNYC’s “toughness” narrative). 
210. Colleen Curry, NYC Neighborhood Hit Hard by Superstorm Sandy Would 
Rather Sell Than Rebuild, ABC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/ 
superstorm-sandy-hit-neighborhood-smarter-sell-rebuild/story?id=19066168 [http:// 
perma.cc/FE4X-3DNF] (quoting New Jersey Governor Chris Christie as saying there is 
“no question . . . we’ll rebuild it”). 
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new business opportunities in record numbers.”211  The City 
also reported in its current coastal management plan that 
“[n]ew housing on waterfront property has helped the city 
accommodate the influx of nearly one million new residents.  
Since 1992, [when the City adopted its first waterfront plan,] 
more than 20,000 new residential units have been built on 
waterfront blocks, with nearly 6,000 additional new units in 
the development pipeline.”212 
Although governments “do not ordinarily dictate where 
people can live, own property, or operate their businesses,” 
they can “use sound zoning regulations and natural hazards 
management programs, along with appropriate building codes 
and practices, to help ensure that people are encouraged to 
avoid especially hazardous locations.”213  Governments “can 
also enact even stricter requirements for critical facilities, such 
as schools and nursing homes, which house particularly 
vulnerable populations.”214 
Maxine Burkett urges that devastation in vulnerable coastal 
areas is a failure of local governments to respond adequately to 
known risks: 
 
Instead of rezoning at-risk areas to cease development, . . . 
decision makers in New York and New Jersey allowed continued 
heavy development of risky coastal areas even though they were 
increasingly aware of the potential for “massive storm surge in 
the region.”  At least two fatalities in Staten Island occurred in 
developments completed as recently as the 1990s in coastal areas 
at extreme risk of storm surge flooding.215 
 
211. N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW 55 OF 2011:  CLEAN WATERFRONT PLAN 4 (2014), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/downloads/pdf/publications/2014_nyc_clean_waterfront
_plan.pdf [http://perma.cc/X7N3-86BX]. 
212. VISION 2020, supra note 126, at 13.  
213. ED THOMAS ET AL., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION ASS’N, PLANNING AND 
BUILDING LIVABLE, SAFE & SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES:  THE PATCHWORK QUILT 
APPROACH 7 (2013), http://nhma.info/uploads/publications/Patchwork%20Quilt 
UPDATED.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z6LA-YRH6].  
214. Id.; see also Andrea McArdle, Storm Surges, Disaster Planning, and Vulnerable 
Populations at the Urban Periphery:  Imagining A Resilient New York After Superstorm 
Sandy, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 19, 19–41 (2014) (contrasting the harm to vulnerable 
populations and infrastructure in the City’s flood zones following Superstorm Sandy 
with the City’s policy of rebuilding and continued encouragement of waterfront 
development). 
215. Burkett, supra note 73, at 782 (citations omitted).  
  
472 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 40:3 
 
Indeed, more than eight years before Super Storm Sandy, 
Princeton University reported that the rapid population growth 
in New Jersey’s “coastal counties was setting the scene for 
monumental environmental damage and property loss.”216  
Ultimately, New Jersey suffered economic losses from Super 
Storm Sandy estimated at $9 to $15 billion.217 
Although the damage from Sandy was catastrophic, it was 
not “unthinkable,” as described by New Jersey Governor Chris 
Christie.218  Rather, the storm and resulting damages were 
foreseeable, and future damaging storms of its magnitude and 
of greater magnitude are also foreseeable.219  Thus, New York 
City officials—and other municipal leaders considering how to 
reduce the mounting toll of floods and other hazards—would be 
wise to “keep foremost in [their] minds that the best disaster 
response and recovery comes from proper planning, land use, 
and building codes that prevent the disaster from ever 
happening in the first place.”220 
In light of the devastation from Sandy (and before that 
Hurricanes Irene and Lee) and the projections of more frequent 
and more intense future storms, coastal community planning 
must include coordinated multi-jurisdictional efforts “to reduce 
or eliminate unnecessary damage caused by human occupancy 
of hazardous areas.”221  A Stronger, More Resilient New York, 
the City’s post-Sandy catalog of resiliency initiatives, concluded 
that “[e]fforts by [the multiple] agencies [with regulatory 
authority in the coastal zones] are not completely aligned.  This 
lack of unified and coordinated regulatory oversight can lead to 
delayed and unpredictable waterfront activity, complicating the 
 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Cavan Sieczkowski, Hurricane Sandy Damage Photos:  Superstorm’s 
‘Unthinkable’ Aftermath Revealed (PICTURES), HUFF. POST (Oct. 30, 2012), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/30/hurricane-sandy-damage-photos-superstorm-
unthinkable-aftermath_n_2044099.html [http://perma.cc/JF6D-KDZA] (“Chris Christie 
said the wreckage is ‘beyond anything I thought I’d ever see.’  Adding, ‘The level of 
devastation at the Jersey Shore is unthinkable,’ according to CNN.”).  
219. See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 11 (projecting increased frequency and 
intensity of coastal storms).  
220. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 213, at 7. 
221. Id. at 6 (warning that “[w]e need to reduce or eliminate unnecessary damage 
caused by human occupancy of hazardous areas”). 
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achievement of important public goals, including coastal 
resiliency.”222  Without coordination, “the proliferation of 
programs and initiatives may lead to confusion, potential 
diffusion of resources, less than perfect communication within 
and among government entities, and missed opportunities.”223 
Indeed, the local, state and federal legal and policy 
framework governing coastal and estuarine planning and 
management is a complicated web that includes more than a 
dozen related federal, county, state and local laws implemented 
by an even greater number of agencies, departments, 
commissions and task forces.224  These include the federal 
Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”), Submerged Lands 
Act, and Coastal Barrier Resources Act225; the New York State 
Waterfront Revitalization of Coastal Areas and Inland 
Waterways Act (“NYS CZMA”), Waterfront Revitalization 
Program (“WRP”), Tidal Wetlands Act (“TWA”), and Coastal 
Erosion Hazard Area Act (“CEHA”)226; and the New York City 
New Waterfront Revitalization Program, comprehensive 
coastal management plan, the coastal chapter of Stronger, 
 
222. See STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 40 (discussing coordination 
challenges).  
223. Patricia E. Salkin, New York Climate Change Report Card:  Improvement 
Needed for More Effective Leadership and Overall Coordination with Local 
Government, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 925 (2009). 
224. For example, the CZMA implements the national Coastal Zone Management 
Program, which is administered federally by the Department of Commerce under the 
direction of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) and at 
the state level by an agency designated by each state or territory.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1455–
1456; see generally N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G. ZONING RESOLUTION AMENDMENT, 
supra note 176.  In New York, the Coastal Zone Management Program is implemented 
by the Department of State.  However, under New York law, a municipality may opt to 
adopt a Local Waterfront Revitalization Plan, which is administered by an agency or 
department designated by the municipality.  42 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 915 (McKinney 
2014); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Tit. 19, § 601 (2012) (implementing optional 
LWRP provisions).  
225. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (2006); The Coastal Zone 
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (2012); Coastal Barrier Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. § 
1452(2)(K) (2006).   
226. New York State Waterfront Revitalization of Coastal Areas and Inland 
Waterways Act, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 600.1(c) (2012); Tidal Wetlands 
Act (TWA), N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 661.1 (2012); New York Coastal 
Erosion Hazard Area Act (CEHA), N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 34-0102(5) (McKinney 
2012).   
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More Resilient, and the City’s Zoning Resolution,227 among 
others.  Municipal policies and projects along the City’s 
waterways may also be subject to the state’s common law and 
statutory public trust doctrine228 as well as federal takings 
jurisprudence.229 
New York State enacted the NYS CZMA and adopted a state 
WRP pursuant to the federal CZMA,230 which offers financial 
incentives and management opportunities for participating 
waterfront municipalities.231  New York City adopted its LWRP 
pursuant to an optional provision of New York law,232 and the 
State and U.S. Secretary of Commerce have approved the 
LWRP.233  As a result, local, state and federal actions that 
affect a New York City coastal area or inland waterway must 
be reviewed by the New York City Department of City 
Planning for consistency with the City’s LWRP.234  For actions 
 
227. NYC LWRP, supra note 122; VISION 2020, supra note 126; Zoning Resolution 
Text, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G. (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/ 
zone/zonetext.shtml [http://perma.cc/J9T3-X7QW].   
228. The Underwater Lands Bill, Act of Aug. 7, ch. 791, § 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 4028, 
4029 (codified as amended at N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW § 75 (McKinney 2014)). 
229. See, e.g., New Creek Bluebelt, Phase 4 v. City of New York, No. D42904 (N.Y 
App. Div. Nov. 19, 2014) (finding reasonable probability that city wetlands designation 
is a regulatory taking under federal constitution). 
230. The CZMA implements the national Coastal Zone Management Program, 
which is administered federally by the Department of Commerce under the direction of 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and at the state level by an 
agency designated by each state or territory.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1455–1456-1456; see 
generally PATRICIA SALKIN, NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 9B:02 (4th ed. 
2014). 
231. See generally SALKIN, supra note 230, at § 9B:01.  The intention of New York’s 
Legislature in adopting the NYS CZMA was to provide “a balance between economic 
development and preservation that will permit the beneficial use of coastal . . . 
waterway resources while preventing the . . . diminution of open space areas or public 
access to the waterfront, shoreline erosion, . . . or permanent adverse changes to 
ecological systems.”  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 600.1(c). 
232. 42 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 915 (McKinney 2014); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 19, § 601 (implementing optional LWRP provisions), available at http://www. 
dos.ny.gov/opd/programs/pdfs/Article_42.pdf [http://perma.cc/3K95-J2RS].  
233. NYC LWRP, supra note 122, at Cover Page 2.  
234. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456(c)(1)–(2) & (d) (“Federal agencies shall not approve proposed 
projects that are inconsistent with the enforceable policies of a coastal state’s 
management program, except upon a finding by the Secretary that such project is 
consistent with the purposes of this chapter or necessary in the interest of national 
security.”); 42 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 916 (McKinney 2014) (requiring “state agency program 
actions be undertaken in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent 
practicable with the approved [local] waterfront revitalization program,” including 
reviews conducted under the state environmental quality review act”); 15 C.F.R. pt. 
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directly or indirectly undertaken by state agencies, including 
funding assistance and development projects,235 the state 
agency with jurisdiction must complete an assessment in which 
it determines whether the state action is consistent with the 
NYC LWRP236 and file the assessment with the N.Y. 
Department of State (“NY DOS”).237  When a project involves 
federal action, such as federal funding or the issuance of a 
federal permit, the project is subject to a federal consistency 
review.238 
In order to obtain a finding of consistency, a project must not 
“substantially hinder the achievement of any of the policies [of 
the LWRP] and, where practicable, [must] advance one or more 
of the policies.”239  Only LWRP policies that are relevant to the 
 
930 (2015) (implementing the federal consistency requirements of the CZMA); N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 97.12(d)(13) (2015) (providing for state 
environmental impact review based on effects of proposed action on applicable policies 
of LWRP as opposed to WRP when municipality has an approved LWRP).  See also 
NYC LWRP, supra note 122, at 4 (“As a result of these approvals, state and federal 
discretionary actions within the city’s coastal zone must be consistent to the maximum 
extent practicable with the [L]WRP policies and the city must be given the opportunity 
to comment on all state and federal projects within its coastal zone.”).  See generally 
SALKIN, supra note 230, at § 9B:10 (stating that, once approved, “LWRPs become 
amendments to the state’s coastal management program, and ‘in effect, become the 
policies and standards of the local government, the State of New York, and the federal 
government.’”) (citing and quoting Stutchin v. Town of Huntington, 71 F. Supp. 2d 76, 
89 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)). 
235. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 600.3(a) (2015) (making state 
funding contingent on compliance with article 42 of the Executive Law, which provides 
requirements for NYS CZMA); 42 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 916(1)(a) (requiring NYS Secretary 
of State to examine “programs which involve issuance of permits, licenses, 
certifications and other forms of approval of land use or development, the provision of 
grants, loans and other funding assistance which leads to or influences land use or 
development, [and] directly undertaken land use or development and planning 
activities” for consistency with approved LWRP).  
236. See State Consistency, N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF PLAN’G & DEV., http:// 
www.dos.ny.gov/opd/programs/consistency/state.html [http://perma.cc/UT3D-WHNN] 
(last visited May 20, 2015) (describing state consistency review process).  A copy of the 
N.Y. Department of State CAF is attached as Attachment B and is also available at 
http://www.dos.ny.gov/opd/programs/pdfs/caf2.pdf [http://perma.cc/END3-7A2Q].   
237. 42 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 916(1)(a) (McKinney 2014).  See also State Consistency, 
supra note 236 (describing state consistency review process).  
238. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456(c)(1)–(3) & (d) (2012); 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.30–46 (2015) 
(including consistency for federal agency activities); id. at §§ 930.50–66 (including 
consistency for activities requiring federal license or permit); id. at §§ 930.90–101 
(including consistency for federal assistance to state or local governments); see also 42 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 912(9) (McKinney 2014) (declaring policy of assuring state and 
federal consistency with approved LWRPs). 
239. NYC LWRP, supra note 122, at 6. 
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specific site, surroundings, or action are used to determine 
consistency.240  Furthermore, the LWRP designates several 
Special Natural Waterfront Areas (“SNWAs”) where additional 
considerations must be given due to the “particular natural 
habitat features” of those areas.241 
The City’s current LWRP, which was approved by the City in 
1999 and adopted by the state in 2002, focuses on increasing 
public access to the waterfront and protection of habitat more 
than flood mitigation, and does not consider sea level rise or 
climate change at all.  The LWRP includes a flood and erosion 
hazard policy242 and, when a project is located within an 
SNWA, the primary policy consideration for a consistency 
determination is to “[p]rotect and restore the quality and 
function of ecological systems,” which is subject to guidelines in 
the TWA.243  An activity or project that “protect[s] or restore[s]” 
special features in an SNWA is “consistent with waterfront 
policy for these areas.”244  Additionally, the LWRP recognizes 
that  “enhancement of adjacent areas to provide natural 
buffers” provides a viable method of protecting tidal 
wetlands.245 
Unlike the City’s current LWRP, the City’s comprehensive 
coastal management plan Vision 2020 expressly recognizes a 
policy of increasing climate resilience.246  Vision 2020, released 
in 2011, provides the policies and goals that the City has set for 
the revitalization of its waterfront area by the year 2020.247  
The City Council approved revisions to its LWRP to incorporate 
 
240. Id. at 7.  
241. Id. 
242. Similarly, the WRP provides that one policy of the State in regards to public 
access is to “[p]rotect, maintain, and increase the levels and types of public access to 
public water-related recreation resources and facilities so that these resources and 
facilities may be fully utilized by all the public” with priority provided to public 
beaches.  Waterfront Revitalization of Coastal Areas and Inland Waterways, N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 600.5(g) (Mckinney 2012).  The WRP also provides 
that “[a]ccess to the public foreshore and to lands immediately adjacent to the 
foreshore or water’s edge that are publicly owned shall be provided . . . . Such lands 
shall be retained in public ownership.”  Id. § 600.5(e)(2). 
243. NYC LWRP, supra note 122 , at 16. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at 18. 
246. VISION 2020, supra note 126, at 104–13 (describing “Goal 8:  Increase climate 
resilience”). 
247. Id. at 6. 
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the goals in Vision 2020, including the climate resilience 
goal.248  Notably, the revised LWRP will require consideration 
in the planning and design of all new development projects of 
“the potential vulnerabilities of the project to the effects of sea 
level rise, coastal flooding, and storm surge over its usable life 
and the general consequences to the project of these types of 
events.”249 
Given that waterfront projects that are undertaken by, 
funded by, or approved by the city, state or federal government 
must be consistent with the City’s LWRP, and local actions 
must also be consistent with the City’s other applicable plans 
including Vision 2020, one concrete action the City can take to 
increase coastal resilience is to revisit its LWRP and Vision 
2020 with an eye toward further strengthening the coastal 
resilience policies in light of the risks of sea level rise, storm 
surge and other weather extremes.  For example, although the 
City’s proposed amendments to its LWRP require consideration 
of climate change and sea level rise in the planning process, the 
revised LWRP encourages commercial and residential 
development in “appropriate Coastal Zone areas.”250  The 
revised LWRP lists eight criteria for determining what 
constitutes an “appropriate” area for development—none of 
which are climate change or sea level rise related risks.251  
Thus, although the revised LWRP provides that “[p]rojects 
should consider potential risks related to coastal flooding”252 
and planning decisions should consider climate change and sea 
level rise,253 the LWRP could further emphasize the goal of 
coastal resilience by expressly recognizing the risks of 
 
248. NYC REVISED LWRP, supra note 123, at 5–6. 
249. Id. at 43.  
250. NYC REVISED LWRP, supra note 123, at 16–17.  
251. Id. at 16 (listing the following criteria:  “compatibility with the continued 
functioning of the designated Special Natural Waterfront Areas, the Arthur Kill 
Ecologically Sensitive Maritime and Industrial Area, or Significant Maritime and 
Industrial Areas, where applicable; the absence of unique or significant natural 
features or, if present, the potential for compatible development; the presence of 
substantial vacant or underused land; proximity to existing residential or commercial 
uses; the potential for strengthening upland residential or commercial areas and for 
opening up the waterfront to the public; transportation access; the maritime and 
industrial jobs potentially displaced or created; and the new opportunities created by 
redevelopment”).  
252. Id. at 17. 
253. Id. at 43–44. 
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continued waterfront development and including climate 
change and sea level related risks in the list of criteria for 
determining if an area is appropriate for waterfront 
development. 
Currently, Vision 2020 recognizes sea level rise as an issue, 
but also seeks to support economic development on the 
waterfront and increase “water recreation, waterborne 
transportation, and water-related cultural activities and 
education programs,” with an emphasis on expanding public 
access to the City’s waterfront and waterways.254  If the City 
were to amend Vision 2020 or produce a supplemental coastal 
management plan that clarified that coastal resilience is a 
priority over other competing coastal policies, climate resilience 
could potentially factor more heavily in local planning, zoning 
and permitting decisions. 
Another concrete action the City can take is to review the 
SNWAs to determine if they need to be expanded to remain 
consistent with sea level rise projections.  Relatedly, the state 
can support coastal communities’ resilience efforts by 
reviewing and potentially amending the Tidal Wetlands Act to 
provide for further protection of areas designated as SNWAs.  
State and federal legislatures can also support municipal 
coastal resilience efforts by reviewing and amending state and 
federal coastal zone management programs to place greater 
emphasis on reducing risks related to climate change. 
In the meantime, the City can stop approving the 
development of critical facilities like daycare centers and 
hospitals in areas currently prone to flooding or likely to be 
prone to flooding within the lifetime of the facility.  It can also 
increase its review of commercial and residential developments 
in vulnerable areas to require the projects to have a net 
reduction in the flood resilience of the area, rather than 
requiring only that the project be neutral in terms of flood 
impact.  Of course, implementation of these measures would 
have both political and economic costs including, among other 
things, takings challenges.  The goals of these measures could 
be achieved, potentially, through market mechanisms not 
subject to takings challenges if readily available information 
accurately identified current and future flood risk in the City’s 
 
254. VISION 2020, supra note 126, at 7. 
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most vulnerable areas.  For example, the City’s Green Building 
Task Force proposed that the City amend its current flood map, 
which is based on historical data and does not account for 
future sea level rise, to “reflect projected sea-level rise and 
increases in coastal flooding through the year 2080,” and 
update this map at least once every ten years.255  With readily 
available long-term flood projections, persons desiring to build 
in the most vulnerable areas may themselves opt to choose a 
different location or may find it difficult to secure necessary 
funding or insurance.256 
C. 80 by 50:  Impressive but Probably Insufficient to Stay 
Within a 2°C Pathway 
The City’s September 2014 announcement of its “80 by 50” 
initiative distinguishes the City as a role model city with 
respect to local GHG emissions reduction commitments, 
consistent with the City’s boast that the revised commitment 
makes New York “the largest city in the world to commit to 
this goal.”257  However, to avoid dangerous interference with 
our climate system, New York City and municipalities looking 
to the City’s initiative as a possible model should consider 
whether they can commit to larger, more accelerated 
reductions. 
1.  Is the City’s Target Sufficient to Avoid Dangerous 
Interference with the Climate System? 
AR5 warns that to have a better than two-in-three chance of 
avoiding the dangerous interference with our climate system 
that would occur with a 2°C increase in average global 
temperatures over pre-industrial levels,258 global GHG 
 
255. NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at BR1-1 to BR 1-3.  As of 
April 2015, this proposal had not yet been implemented.  
256. See Nolon, supra note 2, at 337, 343 (discussing market mechanisms for 
shifting patterns of development out of disaster prone areas).  
257. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 3.  Note, however, that numerous 
other cities in the United States and abroad have committed to achieving larger 
reductions.  See infra notes 299–301 & accompanying text. 
258. The 2009 Copenhagen Accord “recognize[d] the scientific view that the increase 
in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius,” or 3.6°F, to prevent 
dangerous interference with the climate system, prevention of which was the goal of 
the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (“UNCCC”).  Note that many small 
island nations called for a goal of 1.5°C because 2°C is projected to result in sea level 
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emissions must be reduced by at least 40–70% below 1990 
levels by 2050, and to zero or below by 2100.259  Others warn 
that, to avoid the 2°C threshold, we must decrease human-
caused GHG emissions to zero by 2050,260 and still others warn 
that the carbon emissions budget will be exhausted by between 
2024 and 2039.261 
The City makes three claims with respect to its role in 
reducing emissions sufficient to avoid the “most dangerous 
impacts of climate change.”262  First, the City claims that its 
commitment is “in line with the UN target,” which the City 
characterizes as a 50% reduction below 1990 levels by 2050.  
Second, the City suggests that its commitment is larger than 
this UN target and in line with a higher UN target for 
 
rise that would submerge some of these nations.  See generally Climate Change:  The 
‘Greatest Threat’ to the Peoples of the Pacific, ISLAND BUS. (July 31, 2014), http:// 
www.islandsbusiness.com/news/palau/5906/climate-change-the-greatest-threat-to-the-
peoples-/ [http://perma.cc/TF5U-PUTL]. 
259. See John C. Dernbach, Achieving Dramatic Reductions in GHG Emissions 
Through Sustainable Development, in Sarah J. Adams-Schoen et al., supra note 5, at 
10029–31.  In his article, John Dembach cites and parses apart the following 
paragraph from IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013:  THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 27 (2013) 
(footnotes omitted), available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/ 
WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/L7KM-TCWH] [hereinafter WGI SPM]:  
 
Limiting the warming caused by anthropogenic CO2 emissions alone with a 
probability of >33%, >50%, and >66% to less than 2°C since the period 1861–1880, 
will require cumulative CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic sources to stay 
between 0 and about 1570 GtC (5760 GtCO2), 0 and about 1210 GtC (4440 GtCO2), 
and 0 and about 1000 GtC (3670 GtCO2) since that period, respectively.  These 
upper amounts are reduced to about 900 GtC (3300 GtCO2), 820 GtC (3010 GtCO2), 
and 790 GtC (2900 GtCO2), respectively, when accounting for non-CO2 forcings as 
in RCP2.6.  An amount of 515 [445 to 585] GtC (1890 [1630 to 2150] GtCO2) was 
already emitted by 2011. 
 
Id. 
260. See, e.g., B Team Open Letter Calls for Bold Climate Action at COP21 in Paris, 
B TEAM (Feb. 5, 2015), http://bteam.org/the-b-team/b-team-open-letter-calls-for-bold-
climate-action-at-cop21-in-paris/ [http://perma.cc/BF5N-PFGZ ]; see also V. 
Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference with the 
Climate System:  Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14245, 
14245 (2008) (estimating global warming of 2.4°C even if GHG concentrations held to 
2005 levels). 
261. Dernbach, supra note 259, at 10030 n.16 (citing Malte Meinshausen et al., 
Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for Limiting Global Warming to 2°C, 458 NATURE 
1158, 1159 (2009), in stating that based on past and projected emissions, “we would 
exhaust the CO2 emission budget by 2024, 2027 or 2039, depending on the probability 
accepted for exceeding 2°C (respectively 20%, 25% or 50%)”). 
262. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 5.  
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developed nations.  Third, the City suggests that it has set this 
higher target to account for the City’s historically 
disproportionately high contributions of GHG emissions and 
higher per capita emissions: 
 
In line with the UN target, we will put New York City on a 
pathway to achieve an 80 percent reduction in GHG emissions 
from 2005 levels by 2050. 
 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“UNFCCC”) projects that by 2050, global GHG 
emissions must be reduced by 50% below 1990 levels to avoid the 
most dangerous impacts of climate change.  Developed countries 
must reduce their emissions even more aggressively—by up to 
80% by 2050—to account for their greater contribution to global 
emissions to date and their higher than average per-capita 
emissions.  If we fail, the impacts of climate change will be far-
reaching and felt by all, but with the worst consequences for the 
world’s poorest and most vulnerable populations.263 
 
Although the City’s emissions reduction commitment of 80% 
below 2005 levels by 2050 is amongst the highest municipal 
GHG emissions reductions commitments, the City’s three 
claims nevertheless warrant scrutiny.  First, the City’s claim 
that its commitment is “in line with the UN target” of 50% by 
2050 is accurate if the UNFCC’s Bali Action Plan’s so-called 
“50 by 50” proposal is interpreted as a “UN target.”264  The 
2007 Bali Action Plan called for a long-term objective that 
included reduction of global emissions 50% below 1990 levels 
by 2050, and this proposal was endorsed by the Group of Eight 
Industrialized nations.265  But, to clarify, a 50 by 50 target is 
not present in any binding or nonbinding international 
agreement.  Additionally, it should be noted that the 50 by 
2050 objective was likely based on AR4 projections,266 and AR5 
 
263. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 5–6; see also United Nations 
General Assembly, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 
UNTS 107; S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38; U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 
849 (1992) [hereinafter “UNFCCC”]. 
264. Conference of the Parties, Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, UN Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008).  
265. See Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference:  A 
Postmortem, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 230, 235 (2010). 
266. THIRD WORLD NETWORK (TWN), SHARED VISION AND BURDEN SHARING IN THE 
“GLOBAL GOAL” 2 (2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/smsn/ngo/ 
064.pdf [http://perma.cc/6M6N-EADH] (suggesting the 50 by 50 target comes from 
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revised the target upwards to between 40 and 70 by 2050.267  
Also, the City’s target and the Bali Action Plan proposal are 
based on different baselines.  Nevertheless, even taking into 
consideration the differences in baseline, the City’s 
commitment to reduce its emissions 80% below 2005 levels by 
2050 is in line with both the Bali Action Plan proposal of 50 by 
50 and the AR5 global targets of 40–70% below 1990 levels by 
2050.268 
However, the City’s claim that its target is consistent with 
the UN’s 80 by 50 target for developed countries269 is 
potentially misleading.  Unlike the City’s 80 by 50 target, 
which refers to reductions below 2005 levels, the UN’s call for 
80% reductions by 2050 for developed countries refers to 
reductions below 1990 levels.270  Using global emissions data 
from 1990 and 2005, the UN’s 80 by 50 target equates to a 
reduction from 35.0 GtCO2e to 7.0 GtCO2e; whereas, the City’s 
target equates to a reduction from 43.16 GtCO2e to 8.63 
GtCO2e271 (based on global data), a difference of 1.6 gigatonnes 
of CO2 equivalent.  The City’s target would have to be 
increased to 83.78% to achieve the larger UN goal for developed 
countries.272  To assess the true significance of the difference in 
baseline, the City’s goal should be adjusted to reflect the 
difference between New York City’s 1990 and 2005 GHG 
 
footnote 1 linked to the fourth paragraph of the Bali Action Plan chapeau, which refers 
to figures in AR4, Working Group III). 
267. See Dernbach, supra note 259, at 10030; AR5 WGI SPM, supra note 258, at 27.  
268. The City uses a 2005 baseline and the Bali Action Plan and AR5 use a 1990 
baseline.  Based on global emissions data, 80% below 2005 emissions (43.16 GtCO2e * 
0.2 = 8.63 GtCO2e) is a larger reduction than 70% below 1990 emissions (35.0 GtCO2e 
* 0.3 = 10.5 GtCO2e).  See also infra notes 271–72 & accompanying text (citing source 
of data and further comparing goals based on different baselines).  
269. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16 (recognizing UN call for “[d]eveloped 
countries [to] reduce their emissions even more aggressively—by up to 80% by 2050—
to account for their greater contribution to global emissions to date and their higher 
than average per-capita emissions.”).  “Developed countries” refers to “Annex I” 
countries of the Kyoto Protocol. 
270. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 5–6. 
271. This back-of-the-envelope conversion is based on global emissions of 35.0 
GtCO2e in 1990 and 43.16 GtCO2e in 2005, an increase of 23.33%.  See Climate Action 
Tracker, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, http://climateactiontracker.org [http://perma.cc/ 
7GRM-8JX7] (last visited June 26, 2015). 
272. Eighty percent below 1990 levels (35.0 GtCO2e) and 83.78% below 2005 levels 
(43.16 GtCO2e) is 7.0 GtCO2e (the UN target).  80% below 2005 levels (43.16 GtCO2e) 
and 75% below 1990 levels (35.0 GtCO2e) is 8.63 GtCO2e (the City target based on 
global data). 
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emissions; however, 1990 emissions levels for the City are not 
available.273 
Finally, the City’s suggestion that it has set a higher target 
than the so-called UN 50 by 50 target to account for the City’s 
historically disproportionately high contributions of GHG 
emissions and higher per capita emissions may accurately 
describe the City’s intention in setting its 80 by 50 goal, but 
may nonetheless give readers a false sense that the “most 
dangerous impacts of climate change”274 will be avoided as long 
as developed countries and their cities “reduce their 
emissions . . . aggressively—by up to 80 percent by 
2050 . . . .”275  The projections underlying the UN call for 
developed countries to reduce emissions by 80% assume that 
countries will meet their commitments, an assumption that has 
not borne out in practice. 
Specifically, assuming developed country emissions are 
reduced by 80% (from 1990 levels) and other countries meet 
their reduction pledges, the global average reduction is 
projected to be sufficient to limit average global emissions to 21 
gigatonnes by 2050, an amount projected to keep us within the 
2°C pathway.276  However, a significant gap exists between 
GHG emissions reductions pledges and the 21 gigatonnes by 
2050 ceiling.277  The International Energy Agency (“IEA”) 
projects that—even assuming full implementation of existing 
government measures to curb CO2 emissions and cautious 
implementation of policies in the pipeline—GHG emissions will 
rise 20% by 2040, “putting the world on track for a long-term 
global temperature increase of 3.6°C.”278  And others project 
 
273. URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, 90 BY 50:  NYC CAN REDUCE ITS CARBON FOOTPRINT 
90% BY 2050 14 (2013), available at http://urbangreencouncil.org/sites/default/ 
files/90_by_50_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/49N7-NVRE] (reporting that accurate GHG 
emissions data for the city date back only to 2005). 
274. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 5.  
275. Id.  See also UNFCCC, supra note 263. 
276. The UNEP issued a progress report in 2012 on global emissions, which 
concluded that, among other things, to stay within the 2°C pathway, average global 
GHG emissions need to be limited to 21 gigatonnes by 2050.  UN ENV’T PROGRAMME, 
THE EMISSION GAP REPORT 2012:  A UNEP SYNTHESIS REPORT 3 (2012).  
277. See id. at 1 (projecting that filed pledges pursuant to the Copenhagen Accord 
would result in a gap by 2020 of 14 gigatonnes between global emissions and the level 
needed to stay below 2°C). 
278. See IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 FACT SHEET 1–2 (2014), available at 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2014/141112_WEO_FactSheets.
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even bleaker scenarios.279  At the 2013 Conference of Parties 
(“COP19”) in Warsaw, recognizing this “ambition gap,” the 
parties agreed that global GHG emissions need to peak this 
decade, and get to zero net emissions by the second half of this 
century.  Similarly, both the UNEP and IEA have been urging 
since 2010 that to have a reasonable chance of staying within 
the 2°C pathway, countries must make vigorous efforts to cut 
their GHG emissions by the year 2020, with even stronger 
action thereafter.280  Climate Tracker projects that, to stay 
within a 2°C pathway, developed country reductions need to be 
within the range of 25–40% below 1990 levels by 2020, based 
on projections from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 
(“AR4”).281  For New York City’s 2005-baseline target to be 
roughly consistent with this 2020 goal (which should be 
increased to account for the more up-to-date projections in 
AR5), the City’s reductions must be in the range of 39–51% 
below 2005 levels by 2020.282 
To further illustrate the gap, Scenarios A and B in the table 
below show two paths toward a global 50 by 50 target.283  In 
 
pdf [http://perma.cc/D3XL-BRZY].  This projection is based on IEA’s “New Policies 
Scenario,” which “takes into account policies and implementing measures affecting 
energy markets that had been adopted as of mid-2014, together with relevant policy 
proposals, even if specific measures needed to put them into effect have yet to be fully 
developed.  It assumes only cautious implementation of such commitments and plans.”  
IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 687 (2014), available at http://www. 
worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/energymodel/policydatabase/WEO2014_Ann
exB.pdf [http://perma.cc/RM5N-GBH4]. 
279. See, e.g., Ramanathan & Feng, supra note 260, at 14245 (estimating global 
warming of 2.4°C even if GHG concentrations held to 2005 levels). 
280. See IEA, Executive Summary, in WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010 45 (2010); 
UNEP, Technical Summary, in THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT:  ARE THE COPENHAGEN 
ACCORD PLEDGES SUFFICIENT TO LIMIT GLOBAL WARMING TO 2°C OR 1.5°C?  A 
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 10 (advance copy) (November 2010).  UNEP suggested that 
to have a likely chance of avoiding exceeding the 2°C threshold, global emissions must 
peak before 2020, with substantial declines in emissions thereafter.  “Likely” refers to a 
greater than 66% probability.  Id. at 14. 
281. See Climate Action Tracker, supra note 271. 
282. As with the above conversions, this conversion is based on global GHG 
emissions data, and not New York City data, for 1990 and 2005.  
283. The data in the table and this analysis is illustrative only.  It is based on a 
compilation of sources that likely do not include the same assumptions.  The 1990 data 
for “developed” countries is from an excel spreadsheet derived from the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.  UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY OF GHG EMISSIONS FOR ANNEX I 1 
(2012), available at https://unfccc.int/files/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/ 
application/pdf/ai_ghg_profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8Q2-ARE3].  
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Scenario A, developed countries achieve an 80% reduction of 
their GHG emissions from 1990 levels and in Scenario B 
developed countries achieve a 100% reduction from 1990 levels.  
As Scenario A shows, if developed countries reduce their 
emissions 80% (i.e., from 19 to 3.8 gigatonnes of CO2 
equivalent), developing countries would have to decrease their 
emissions 33% (i.e., from 20.4 to 13.7 gigatonnes of CO2 
equivalent) in order to achieve a global emissions reduction of 
50% (i.e., from 35 to 17.5 gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent).  While 
a 33% reduction may sound attainable, at least as compared to 
80%, note that developing countries would have to achieve this 
reduction in emissions at the same time as their populations 
are expected to double,284 which means that Scenario A would 
require developing countries to decrease their emissions from 
5.0 tonnes per capita to 1.7 tonnes per capita—a 66% reduction 
in per capita emissions.  Moreover, they would have to reduce 
per capita emissions by 66% while at the same time attempting 
to increase GNP.285  Scenario B also depicts a path toward a 
global 50 by 50 target, with developed countries achieving 
100% reductions in their emissions.  In this scenario, to get the 
rest of the way toward a 50% reduction in global emissions, 
developing countries would have to reduce emissions to 14% 
below the 1990 baseline.  Given expected population growth, a 
14% decrease in developing country emissions represents a 
56% reduction in per capita emissions. 
 
Year/ 
Scenario 
Total GHG 
emissions 
(gigatonnes 
of CO2 
equivalent) 
Developed 
country 
emissions  
Developing 
country 
emissions 
Pop. of 
developing 
countries 
(billions) 
Developing 
country 
emissions 
per capita  
 
284. The population of developing countries’ is expected to double between 1990 and 
2050 (from 4.1 billion to 8 billion), while the population of developed countries is 
expected to remain relatively flat.  Press Release, UN Population Division, World 
Population to Exceed 9 Billion by 2050 (Mar. 11, 2009), available at http:// 
www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/pressrelease.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
GF4A-W9UJ].  
285. Developing countries are projected to have continued GNP growth of 6% per 
year (or 4% GNP growth per capita).  U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS & U.N. CONF. 
ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 2013 6 (2013), 
available at http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_archive/2013 
wesp.pdf [http://perma.cc/H7EL-P4CH]. 
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1990 35 19 20.4 4 5.0 
2050: 17.5 3.8 13.7 8 1.7 
Scenario 
A 
(50%) (80%) (33%) (66%) 
2050: 17.5 0 17.5 8 2.2 
Scenario 
B 
(50%) (100%) (14%) (56%) 
 
As a normative question, how much of the onus of staying 
within a 2°C pathway should be placed on developing versus 
developed countries is hotly debated.  But, as a positive 
question, the crux of the issue is whether in combination 
developed and developing countries can achieve the reductions 
necessary to stay within a 2°C pathway, and, if so, how that 
can be done.  The proposition that developing countries will 
achieve per capita reductions of between 52 and 61% appears 
untenable.  Although developing countries have fewer 
infrastructure locked-in problems,286 in light of doubling 
populations, steady GNP growth, and substantially fewer 
resources,287 it is difficult to fathom how developing countries 
could achieve even a 52% per capita cut in emissions. 
2. Can the City Achieve Deeper Reductions? 
Of course, cities—even cities of the scale of New York City—
cannot control all or even most of the factors that contribute to 
local GHG emissions.288  According to the U.S. Energy 
Information Agency (“EIA”), the factors that contribute to 
statewide per-capita GHG emissions include climate, the 
structure of the state economy, population density, energy 
sources, building standards, and explicit state policies to 
reduce emissions.289  Although cities tend to have control over 
 
286. See supra note 284 (discussing opportunities in developing countries).  
287. WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 2013, supra note 285, at 67. 
288. See supra Part I.A. (discussing municipality’s ability to influence factors that 
contribute to GHG emissions).  
289. See generally EIA, EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 
2008 (2009), available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/0573(2008).pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/7QZV-KSDW]. 
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building efficiencies and density,290 most existing cities have 
little control over the remaining factors.291  Cities have little or 
no control over their baseline climate or whether the city or 
state economy is largely driven by energy production or non-
energy-production activities.292  Further, state public utility 
commissions and legislatures typically shape energy use in a 
state.  Increasingly, however, cities are exerting influence or 
control over the energy sources they use for heating and 
electricity.293 
Indeed, more than 80% of New York City’s GHG emissions 
reductions to-date are attributable to the City’s shift from coal 
and oil energy sources to natural gas and, to a small extent, 
renewable resources, and other improvements to utility 
operations.294  The City characterizes these reductions as the 
low-hanging fruit, observing that improvement in utility 
operations strategies “cannot be replicated, and future 
reductions will be much more difficult to achieve.”295 
PlaNYC’s planners and advisory board set the City’s target 
so that it would be both aggressive and achievable, on the 
 
290. See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing New York City’s building efficiency 
initiatives).  
291. IPCC, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:  MITIGATION 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Edenhofer, O. et al. 
eds., 2014). 
292. See Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and Cities, in Adams-Schoen et al., 
supra note 5, at 10037 (discussing factors, noting that energy-producing economies are 
tied to the physical location of energy resources, and identifying Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania as an example of a city that has shifted its economy to non-energy 
production activities). 
293. See id. at 10038 (discussing Chicago, Illinois’ “electric aggregation” program 
whereby the city decreased its reliance on coal and increased its use of renewable 
resources by entering into long-term power purchase agreements (“PPAs”) with 
electricity suppliers on behalf of its citizens).  See also Herman K. Trabish, A Utility in 
the Making:  The Municipalization of Boulder, Colorado, UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/a-utility-in-the-making-the-municipalization-of-
boulder-colorado/300268/ [http://perma.cc/UUD9-3XPM] (discussing municipalization of 
electric utilities); Mahesh Bhave, Microgrids Create Municipalization Benefits, 
RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (June 2, 2014), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/ 
rea/news/article/2014/06/microgrids-create-municipalization-benefits [http://perma.cc/ 
Y7FQ-9ZXU] (discussing local efforts around distributed generation). 
294. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 7.  Changes in utility operations 
included:  decreased wastewater treatment plan methane, improved landfill methane 
capture, less carbon intensive electricity generation, more efficient steam generation, 
and a reduction in fugitive SF6 emissions.  Id. 
295. Id. at 6. 
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theory that an overly ambitious or unrealistic target would not 
be implemented.296  At least in PlaNYC’s initial stages, the 
Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability (“OLTPS”) 
took a more conservative approach in its modeling and based 
efficiency estimates on current technologies, rather than on 
future technological improvements.297  In initially developing 
PlaNYC’s emissions reduction target, OLTPS researched best 
practice plans and programs, including Portland, Oregon’s 
climate action plan, Santa Monica’s sustainability plan, 
London’s Better Buildings Partnership Program, and 
congestion pricing programs in London and Stockholm.298 
These cities and others may provide models for New York 
City to increase and accelerate its GHG emissions reduction 
commitment.  By way of comparison, London, England has set 
CO2 emissions reduction targets of 20% by 2015, 40% by 2020, 
60% by 2025 and 80% by 2030 (from 1990 levels);299 the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government’s target is 25% by 2020 (from 2000 
levels)300; and, the City of Chicago’s target is 25% by 2020 (from 
1990 levels).301  The Urban Green Council, the New York 
Chapter of the U.S. Green Building Council, has also identified 
strategies for the City to achieve more aggressive emissions 
reduction, ultimately concluding that the City can achieve a 
90% reduction from its 2010 GHG emissions levels by 2050.302 
 
296. ICLEI PLANYC CASE STUDY, supra note 30, at 20. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. at 29.  
299. Mayor of London, Executive Summary, in DELIVERING LONDON’S ENERGY 
FUTURE:  THE MAYOR’S CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND ENERGY STRATEGY viii–ix 
(2011), available at http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Energy-future-oct11-
exec-summ.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZC44-VSTN].  In 2007, Parliament enacted the Greater 
London Authority Act 2007, which imposes a duty on the London mayor to address 
climate change as it relates to Greater London, including strategies for minimizing 
GHG emissions and increasing efficient production and use of energy.  Greater London 
Authority Act 2007, 2007, c. 24, §§ 42–44 (Eng.), available at http://www. 
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/24/pdfs/ukpga_20070024_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/9KAE-
Y6Q3]. 
300. Carbonn Climate Report:  Tokyo Metropolitan Government, CARBONN CLIMATE 
REGISTRY, http://carbonn.org/data/report/commitments/?tx_datareport_pi1[uid]=102 
[http://perma.cc/5EWQ-9YLC] (last visited June 13, 2015). 
301. Carbonn Climate Report:  City of Chicago, CARBONN CLIMATE REGISTRY, 
http://carbonn.org/data/report/commitments/?tx_datareport_pi1[uid]=327 [http://perma. 
cc/R7QG-XAHH] (last visited June 13, 2015). 
302. URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, supra note 273, at 1. 
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However, without additional supportive state and federal 
policies, municipalities like New York City remain constrained 
in their ability to achieve maximum GHG emissions 
reductions.  For example, preemption and other hurdles beyond 
the City’s control limit the extent to which the City can impose 
performance standards on motor vehicles.303  The result is that 
although NYC’s 80 by 50 initiative probably makes an 
insufficient contribution to the global effort to remain within a 
2°C pathway, the target may be close to the City’s maximum 
achievable target.304  Nevertheless the targets of other cities 
like London suggest that New York City should reevaluate 
whether it can achieve an even higher target, including an 
aggressive 2020 target. 
D. Setting the Standard for Local Data Collection, Analysis and 
Benchmarking 
New York City’s local data collection, analysis and 
benchmarking initiatives provide a model of municipal data 
analysis and transparency.  Resiliency, sustainability and 
energy efficiency data benchmarking like the City’s provides 
relatively easy access to information that has the potential to 
encourage market transactions that favor sustainable market 
participants; shape energy-efficient and other sustainable and 
resilient behaviors; and provide an empirical foundation upon 
which to assess current initiatives and guide future policies.305 
When the Mayor’s Office convened NPCC1 in 2008, New 
York City became the first city to scale down the United 
Nation’s IPCC global climate models to develop climate-related 
 
303. See infra Part III.F (discussing state and federal law and policy obstacles to 
municipal mitigation); but see Climate Smart Communities Summary for Local 
Officials, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVT’L CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/ 
energy/50851.html [http://perma.cc/P6BT-WK8F] (last visited May 21, 2015) (providing 
resources for local communities to decrease GHG emissions).  
304. But see URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, supra note 273, at 1 (asserting that the City 
can achieve a 90% reduction from 2010 GHG emissions levels by 2050). 
305. See, e,g., Klass, supra note 292, at 10038 (discussing energy efficiency 
benchmarking and noting that Austin, Texas; Seattle, Washington; Washington, D.C.; 
and Minneapolis, Minnesota “impose some form of benchmarking requirements on 
commercial buildings and mandate some information disclosure to local governments 
or prospective buyers to increase demand for energy efficient buildings”). 
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projections specific to a municipality.306  The City’s subsequent 
codification of Local Law 42—which established NPCC as an 
ongoing body with regular data analysis and reporting 
requirements, and established a New York City climate change 
adaptation task force, also with regular reporting 
requirements307—and Local Law 84—which requires regular 
reporting on energy and water use of public and private 
properties308—distinguishes the City as ahead of the curve with 
respect to local-scale climate data analysis, risk assessment, 
and benchmarking. 
With respect to the City’s emissions reductions and other 
building sustainability plans, building owners are mandated by 
law to annually record energy and water use, and this 
information is publicly disclosed by the City.309  With the 
release of the City’s Local Law 84 benchmarking report in 
2013, the City became the first U.S. city to analyze and publicly 
disclose energy and water use data for multiple years for more 
than 8,000 private sector properties.310  With respect to the 80 
by 50 initiative, the City also updates its GHG emissions 
inventory annually and reports on the progress of its climate 
change mitigation initiatives in annual reports that are 
publically available on the City’s website.311 
In addition to accountability mechanisms specific to the 
green building and 80 by 50 initiatives, OLTPS also uses 
multiple approaches for monitoring and reporting progress on 
the City’s other sustainability initiatives.  OLTPS produces 
annual PlaNYC progress reports, which provide detailed 
 
306. IPCC, the international advisory body on climate change, was formed in 1988 
by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment 
Programme.  See NPCC2, supra note 94.  
307. 2012 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 42 (codified at N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-122–3-
123).  See also supra notes 144–47 & accompanying text (discussing NPCC and task 
force requirements).  
308. 2005 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 86 § 2, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dob/ 
downloads/pdf/ll_86of2005.pdf [http://perma.cc/RM7Y-U5U3]. 
309. See id.; BENCHMARKING REPORT 2014, supra note 27, at 8. 
310. PROGRESS REPORT 2014, supra note 24, at 19.  
311. See PlaNYC, Ongoing Resiliency Projects, MAYOR’S OFFICE OF RECOVERY & 
RESILIENCY, http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/progress/progress.shtml [http:// 
perma.cc/MS4H-TG63] (last visited Mar. 8, 2015) (providing links to progress and 
benchmarking reports); see also, e.g., CITY OF NEW YORK, INVENTORY OF NEW YORK 
CITY GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2014), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
planyc/downloads/pdf/NYC_GHG_Inventory_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/4ME7-486E].  
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updates on the implementation progress of the 127 PlaNYC 
initiatives.312  Following the City’s publication of its 
comprehensive analysis of vulnerabilities post-Sandy, Stronger, 
More Resilient, the annual PlaNYC progress report also 
includes updates on the resiliency initiatives proposed in 
Stronger, More Resilient.313  These reporting requirements are 
codified in local law, which, among other things requires the 
City to report on a set of sustainability indicators to measure 
the progress towards achieving the goals in PlaNYC.314  The 
City’s sustainability indicators were released on Earth Day 
2009 and have since been incorporated into the City’s Citywide 
Performance Report, which the City updates on a monthly 
basis and which is available online.315 
The City is also involved in a number of data initiatives at 
the national and international scale.  For example, the City 
contributed data to the Building Performance Database, a 
data-sharing platform in partnership with the U.S. 
Department of Energy (“DOE”).316  The City has also joined the 
Urban Sustainability Directors Network, an international 
community of municipalities that are engaging in 
benchmarking and exchanging best practices and lessons-
learned.317  OLTPS also participated as a Steering Committee 
member in the development of the STAR Community Index, a 
national sustainability framework for local governments.318 
 
312. See, e.g., PROGRESS REPORT 2014, supra note 24, at 34–54. 
313. See, e.g., id. at 91–106.  
314. 2008 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 17.  
315. See ICLEI PLANYC CASE STUDY, supra note 30, at 45 (describing City’s 
mechanisms for reporting on implementation of its sustainability plan).  
316. PROGRESS REPORT 2014, supra note 24, at 33.  
317. Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance Press Release—March 2015, URB. 
SUSTAINABILITY DIRECTORS NETWORK (Mar. 27, 2015), http://usdn.org/public/ 
CNCAMarch2015PressRelease.html [http://perma.cc/XE7V-MUCS].   
318. See generally STAR Sustainability Goals and Guiding Principles, ICLEI, 
http://www.icleiusa.org/sustainability/star-community-index/star-goals-and-guiding-
principles [http://perma.cc/M34Q-3W5A] (last visited May 21, 2015) (STAR’s “81 
sustainability goals and 10 guiding principles collectively define community-scale 
sustainability, and present a vision of how communities can become more healthy, 
inclusive, and prosperous across eight specific categories”). 
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E. Green Building Codes and Benchmarking for a Resilient 
Future 
In 2013, the City studied opportunities to achieve an 80 by 50 
reduction based on current technologies.  The study found that 
nearly two-thirds of the GHG reductions that are needed must 
come from more efficient buildings.319  The City has already 
achieved a 19% reduction of its GHG emissions from 2005 
levels, and One City, Built to Last identifies a strategy for 
achieving an additional 61% reduction in GHG emissions by 
2050.320  To stay on track with this, the plan states that the 
City must achieve an overall reduction in the energy used to 
heat, cool, and power buildings of 30% below 2005 levels by 
2025.321 
One question the City’s approach begs is whether the NYC 
Green Codes Task Force’s 111 code amendment proposals are 
sufficient to achieve the deepest possible cuts in GHG 
emissions.322  As of April 2015, 52 of the 111 proposals had 
been implemented and another 4 had been partially 
implemented.323  These proposals are comprehensive and 
proactive, putting New York City at the forefront of 
municipalities using building code reform as a means of climate 
change adaptation and mitigation.  However, a review of model 
codes, USGBC recommendations, and initiatives of other major 
cities such as London suggests that, while New York City’s 
approach puts it ahead of many municipalities, the City should 
continue to examine whether it is responding appropriately to 
the urgency and scope of the climate change problem.  And, 
 
319. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 7 (noting that nearly three-
quarters of the city’s GHG emissions come not from vehicles, but rather from the city’s 
more than one million buildings). 
320. See ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 7–15.  
321. Id.  This target is based on a reduction in the GHG from buildings specifically, 
which emitted 60% of total citywide 2005 GHG emissions.  Id. at 11.  The City states 
that a 30% reduction in these emissions will generate $8.5 billion in total cost savings 
for New Yorkers.  Id.  But see supra Part III.C (discussing need to increase emissions 
reduction goal); URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, supra note 273, at 1 (concluding that 80 by 50 
goal is “noble,” but “not enough” and that the City can achieve an even greater 
reduction). 
322. But see URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, supra note 273, at 17–26 (analyzing numerous 
strategies for decreasing carbon footprint of City’s building sector). 
323. See NYC Green Codes Proposal Tracker, supra note 157 (providing status of all 
111 proposals and links to applicable legislation, local laws, and the proposal).  
  
2015] Sink or Swim 493 
indeed, the NYC Green Codes Task Force proposals call for 
continued examination of how the codes can be most effectively 
amended to mitigate and adapt to climate change.324 
Of the 111 proposals included in the Task Force Report, nine 
proposals specifically targeted building resiliency: 
 
BR1:  Develop flood maps that reflect projected sea-level rise and 
increases in coastal flooding through the year 2080.  Currently, 
flood maps are based on historical data and do not account for 
projected climate change-related sea-level rise.  This proposal 
would create a New York City Climate Change Flood Map, which 
would be updated at least once every ten years.325 
 
BR2:  Require toxic materials stored in the 100-year floodplain to 
be located in flood-proof areas.326 
 
BR3:  Require a multi-agency study of building codes, zoning 
resolutions and urban design in relation to the 100-year flood 
map projected out to 2080.  Building code revisions to be 
considered would include:  (a) foundation requirements that take 
into account the effect of rising sea levels on structures and 
buildings due to buoyancy and water infiltration; (b) freeboard, 
frame and wash-away structures at first floors; (c) areas of refuge 
in the event of a citywide power outage; (d) hurricane-resistant 
buildings; and (e) mold-resistant construction.  Zoning revisions 
to be considered would include:  (a) raising “measuring points” 
within the flood zone; (b) specifying zoning uses to be included 
within flood zones; and (c) requirements for shelter areas and 
areas of refuge.  The study would also include urban design 
aspects.327 
 
BR4:  Require the City to undertake a study to determine 
whether building code and zoning changes are necessary to 
diminish the impacts of non-flood climatic hazards.328 
 
BR5:  Require the City to undertake a study examining the 
climate risks posed to buildings through 2080.  This study would 
determine whether impacts will vary across the city or have a 
 
324. See, e.g., NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at BR3-1 
(recommending that City undertake study to determine how building codes and zoning 
resolutions should be strengthened to protect buildings from sea-level rise and 
flooding).  
325. Id. at BR1-1 to BR1-3. 
326. Id. at BR2-1 to BR2-3. 
327. Id. at BR3-1 to BR3-2. 
328. Id. at BR4-1. 
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uniform impact, and then define and map hazard zones in the 
city based on these risks.  This study would analyze risks from 
the following hazards:  rainfall quantity, frequency, intensity and 
seasonal modifications; heat waves; increased humidity; 
increased temperatures; probability of other extreme weather 
events; rise in groundwater table; encroachment of salinity; 
increased wind velocities; electrical grid disruptions caused by 
extreme weather events; interaction of increased temperatures 
with the urban heat island effect; and impact of increased 
temperature, changes in precipitation and humidity on air 
quality.329 
 
BR6:  Require the City to undertake a study of passive 
survivability330 and dual-mode functionality331 and propose code 
changes to incorporate these concepts into the City’s building 
codes.  This proposal also includes a study on refuge areas in 
sealed buildings.332 
 
BR7:  Amend the New York City Plumbing Code to require that 
toilets and faucets are capable of operating without building 
power for at least two weeks.333 
 
BR8:  Amend the New York City Plumbing Code to prohibit the 
removal of existing water towers and require water towers in all 
new and renovated buildings.334 
BR9:  Endorse the NYC Mayor’s Office of Environmental 
Coordination’s effort to provide guidance for analyzing climate 
change in environmental assessment conducted pursuant to the 
City Environmental Quality Review (“CEQR”).  CEQR is the 
process by which agencies review the effects of proposed actions 
on the environment.  Under the Mayor’s proposal, as endorsed by 
 
329. Id. at BR5-1. 
330. Task Force member Alex Wilson formulated the concept of “passive 
survivability,” which is the idea that buildings should be designed and built so that 
they can remain habitable in the absence of an outside power supply.  Proposal BR6 
notes that, “[i]n the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 30,000 residents of New Orleans 
sought refuge in the Superdome for several days.  This rapidly turned into a nightmare 
because without electricity and air conditioning, temperatures within the building 
became almost unendurably hot.  In contrast, the people who stayed in the French 
Quarter were relatively comfortable.  This is because the older buildings in the Quarter 
were designed for some degree of passive cooling since they were built before air 
conditioning was available.”  Id. at BR6-2. 
331. “Dual mode functionality” refers to reducing the emergency energy needs of the 
building by designing it to function in two modes—a “standard mode” and a “low 
energy” mode.  Id. at BR6-1. 
332. Id.  
333. Id. at BR7-1. 
334. Id. at BR8-1. 
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the Task Force, the CEQR guidelines would be updated to 
include an assessment of the impact of climate change on 
proposed actions.335 
 
As of April 2015, six of the nine building resiliency proposals 
have been implemented:  BR 2 (Safeguard Toxic Materials 
Stored in Flood Zones),336 BR 3 (Study Adaptive Strategies to 
Flooding),337 BR 4 (Study Adaptive Strategies to Non-Flood 
Climatic Risks),338 BR 5 (Forecast Non-Flood Climatic Hazards 
to 2080),339 BR 6 (Analyze Strategies to Maintain Habitability 
During Power Outages),340 and BR 7 (Ensure Toilets and Sinks 
Can Operate During Blackouts).341  BR 1, BR 8 and BR 9 have 
not yet been implemented. 
In evaluating the Task Force’s proposals, one potentially 
useful point of comparison is the International Green 
Construction Code (“IgCC”).  USGBC recommends that states 
and local jurisdictions adopt the International Code Council’s 
(“ICC’s”) IgCC.342  The IgCC was developed to provide a model 
sustainability code for the entire construction project and its 
site; the code establishes minimum green requirements that 
promote sustainability and energy efficiency.343  Although the 
 
335. Id. at BR9-1. 
336. See GCTF Enacted Proposals, MAYOR’S OFFICE OF RECOVERY & RESILIENCY, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/gbee/html/codes/enacted.shtml [http://perma.cc/7F8D-R8SH] 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2015) (citing NYCBC, app. G and 2013 N.Y.C. Local Law 143). 
337. See id. (citing Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency and Building 
Resiliency Task Force).  
338. See id.  
339. See id. (citing 2013 N.Y.C. Local Law 81). 
340. See id. (citing Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency and Building 
Resiliency Task Force). 
341. See id. (citing 2013 N.Y.C. Local Law 79). 
342. Build Better Codes, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc. 
org/advocacy/campaigns/build-better-codes [http://perma.cc/JB8N-VCTF] (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2014).  The IgCC includes ASHRAE (American Society of Heating, 
Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers) Standard 189.1 as a compliance 
pathway.  ASHRAE has published a guide to its Standard 189.1 and a “FAQ.”  
ASHRAE JOURNAL’S GUIDE TO STANDARD 189.1:  BALANCING ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, RESOURCE EFFICIENCY & OCCUPANT COMFORT (June 2010), https:// 
www.ashrae.org/File%20Library/docLib/Publications/AJSupplement_189-1-1-.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S8L7-HE63]; FAQ—STANDARD 189.1:  STANDARD FOR THE DESIGN OF 
HIGH PERFORMANCE, GREEN BUILDINGS EXCEPT LOW-RISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS, 
https://www.ashrae.org/File%20Library/docLib/Publications/189-1-FAQ-4-26-12.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PCY6-NY4A] (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
343. INT’L CODE COUNCIL, AN OVERVIEW OF THE 2012 INTERNATIONAL GREEN 
CONSTRUCTION CODE 13–14 (2012), http://www.iccsafe.org/international-green-
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IgCC was not explicitly crafted for the purpose of promoting 
disaster resilience, the USGBC regards the adoption of model 
codes like the IgCC as essential to minimizing the negative 
effects of extreme weather events.344 
Unlike LEED345 and other voluntary rating systems, the 
IgCC is intended to be adopted on a mandatory basis in order 
to raise the floor for environmental standards.346  Despite this, 
most local jurisdictions that have adopted the IgCC have made 
it voluntary.347  For example, Florida adopted the IgCC as an 
option for the retrofitting and new construction of all state-
owned facilities, Boynton Beach, Florida adopted the IgCC as 
the core of its local voluntary green code, and the cities of 
Phoenix and Scottsdale, Arizona, and the Kayenta Township (a 
tribal community in Arizona) adopted the IgCC for voluntary 
use.348 
Although the City did not adopt the IgCC as a mandatory 
code, it did follow the IgCC model of incorporating 
sustainability and resilience principles in an enforceable code.  
In doing so, the task force concluded that “greening” the 
 
construction-code/ (scroll to bottom of page and click “An Overview of the 2012 
International Green Construction Code”) [http://perma.cc/53VH-WJRE].  The code 
spans construction projects both spatially (providing standards applicable to the entire 
project site and all materials related to the project) and temporally (covering site 
selection and development through pre-occupancy inspection, commissioning and 
maintenance).  Id. at 11–17.  
344. USGBC, GREENING THE CODES 6 (2011), http://www.usgbc.org/Docs/Archive/ 
General/Docs7403.pdf [http://perma.cc/7XDV-Y9ZL].  
345. LEED refers to the USGBC’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
Green Building Rating System.  LEED standards are third-party benchmark 
assessment tools that promote sustainable design and construction principles.  See id. 
at 1.  See generally Sarah Adams-Schoen, On the Waterfront:  New York City’s Climate 
Change Adaptation and Mitigation Challenge, Part II, 25 ENVTL. L. N.Y. 101, 102–104 
(2014) (analyzing the LEED standards and their use in New York). 
346. “Where adopted on a mandatory basis, the IgCC raises the floor of 
sustainability for all buildings–positioning the IgCC to achieve massive environmental 
benefits not possible with voluntary rating systems.”  INT’L CODE COUNCIL, supra note 
343.  
347. See INT’L CODE COUNCIL, ICC FACT SHEET—FIRST INTERNATIONAL GREEN 
CONSTRUCTION CODE (IGCC) ADOPTIONS 1 [hereinafter “ICC FACT SHEET”], http://www. 
iccsafe.org/cs/IGCC/Documents/First_IgCC_Adoptions_FactSheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
6E4W-A9YH] (last visited Mar. 25, 2015); see also INTERNATIONAL CODES-ADOPTION BY 
STATE, INT’L CODE COUNCIL 1 (Feb. 2015), http://www.iccsafe.org/gr/Documents/state 
adoptions.pdf [http://perma.cc/K67F-HHWY] (listing the state-by-state adoption of the 
I-codes). 
348. See ICC FACT SHEET, supra note 347, at 1. 
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building codes “has significant advantages over mandating 
LEED for the private sector.”349  Of course, the options for 
increasing the resilience and decreasing the substantial carbon 
footprint350 of the City’s buildings are far from binary.  Options 
range from green building ordinances that apply only to 
municipal construction or renovation projects, to those that 
apply to private projects that receive public funding, to those 
that apply to both public and private projects.351  Further 
options exist within each of these schemes, including 
application of requirements based on project size or type of 
building.  With respect to rating systems, some municipalities 
use LEED rating systems, others use different third-party 
rating systems, and still others create their own rating 
systems.  Some municipalities permit developers to meet LEED 
“equivalents”352 or comply with LEED guidelines without 
requiring receipt of LEED certification.  Even among those that 
mandate LEED certification (or equivalents), different 
municipalities require different levels of LEED certification 
and allow waivers under different scenarios.  Some ordinances 
mandate that developers meet certain standards, while others 
 
349. NYC GREEN CODES, supra note 151, at 1; see also id. at 1–2 (listing benefits of 
greening the building codes); Adams-Schoen, supra note 345, at 102 (discussing the 
benefits of greening the building codes). 
350. According to the 2013 New York City Local Law 84 Benchmarking Report, New 
York City’s buildings accounted for nearly 75% of the City’s total GHG emissions, 94% 
of the City’s electrical consumption and 85% of its water usage.  BENCHMARKING 
REPORT 2014, supra note 27, at 5. 
351. Patricia E. Salkin, Cooperative Federalism and Climate Change:  New Meaning 
to “Think Globally—Act Locally,” 40 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. LAW INST.) 10562, 10567 
(2010).  Numerous municipalities have mandated LEED certification for new 
construction and major renovations or otherwise required that city-owned buildings be 
built according to green building criteria, including Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Boulder, 
Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Portland, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose ́, and 
Seattle.  See 2005 N.Y.C. Local Law 86 § 1, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
dob/downloads/pdf/ll_86of2005.pdf [http://perma.cc/RM7Y-U5U3] (listing municipalities 
that have implemented green building requirements). 
352. Ordinances that provide incentives for LEED “equivalents” apply not just to 
LEED, but also to other rating systems that the jurisdictions deems equivalent.  See, 
e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §46-19.6 (2015) (requiring counties to give priority application 
processing for projects that achieve LEED Silver or equivalent); Montreat, N.C., Code 
of General Ordinances, Chap. J, Art. I, § 4 (“Projects providing proof of equivalent 
nationally or state recognized certification or rating systems with third-party 
verification of sustainable building practices may also be eligible for comparable 
rebates proportionate to level of certification.”). 
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create incentive schemes.353  Additionally, many states, 
including New York, require LEED for state-owned buildings, 
provide tax credits for buildings that meet certain green 
building criteria, and require state agencies to reduce energy 
use and carbon dioxide emissions and utilize green building 
principles.354 
Although not readily apparent from the NYC Green Codes 
Task Force report, New York City has adopted a scheme for 
certain public and private sector developments that includes 
both “greening” its building codes and mandating LEED 
certifiability.  New York City enacted Local Law 84 in 2005, a 
green building law that requires municipal projects costing 
more than $2 million to be designed to meet or exceed certain 
LEED criteria, although actual certification is not required.355  
The LEED requirements also apply to private developments 
that receive more than 50% City funding or more than $10 
million of City money.356 
Additionally, the Task Force proposals include many 
requirements that are the same or substantially similar to the 
IgCC.  For example, both the Task Force proposals and the 
IgCC include requirements that alterations made to existing 
buildings conform to the new green codes,357 air-conditioning 
systems serving occupied spaces have filters rated at MERV 11 
or higher,358 and establish performance standards for building 
envelopes with respect to heat loss.359 
 
353. See generally 2005 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 86 § 1, available at http:// 
www.nyc.gov/html/dob/downloads/pdf/ll_86of2005.pdf [http://perma.cc/RM7Y-U5U3] 
(summarizing various green building initiatives). 
354. Id. 
355. Buildings classified in occupancy groups G or H-2 must achieve the lowest level 
of LEED certifiability; all other buildings must achieve a minimum of LEED silver 
certifiability.  2005 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 86 § 2, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
dob/downloads/pdf/ll_86of2005.pdf [http://perma.cc/RM7Y-U5U3]. 
356. Id.  
357. IgCC § 1003.1 (2012), available at http://publicecodes.cyberregs.com/icod/ 
IgCC/2012/icod_IgCC_2012_10_sec003.htm [http://perma.cc/DU76-2L5P]; NYC GREEN 
CODES TASK FORCE: FULL PROPOSALS, at OC3-1 to OC3-2 (Feb. 2010), http:// 
www.nyc.gov/html/gbee/downloads/pdf/gctf_all_proposals.pdf [http://perma.cc/U49A-
LBYX]. 
358. IgCC § 803.5 (2012); NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at HT5-1.  
Note that the Task Force proposal imposes this requirement only on systems providing 
ventilation of outdoor air with a design capacity greater than or equal to 5,000 cfm.  Id.  
359. Specifically, the Task Force proposal uses ASHRAE 90.1 with additional fixed 
performance standards.  NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at EF3-1.  
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The Task Force proposals also include numerous 
recommendations that go above and beyond the IgCC.360  These 
proposals include:  (a) requiring entry mat systems to protect 
indoor air from street particulates;361 (b) requiring improved 
design parameters, testing, and balancing for exhaust 
ventilation systems in new residential construction;362 (c) 
requiring the use of mold-resistant gypsum board and cement 
board in water-sensitive locations such as bathrooms;363 (d) 
prohibiting the issuance of new permits for boilers using #4 
and #6 fuel oil and requiring all new burners to use #2 fuel or 
gas fuel;364 (e) phasing out all existing polychlorinated biphenyl 
and magnetic ballasts by 2019;365 (f) reducing the level of 
required emergency lighting, which would reduce battery 
size;366 (g) requiring wastewater from concrete mixer trucks to 
be either treated on site or returned to the manufacturing 
plant for treatment;367 (h) requiring various design features 
and signage to promote stairway use as a means of promoting 
fitness and physical activity;368 and (i) increasing the number of 
required water fountains in commercial buildings to reduce 
consumers’ intake of bottled water and sugary sodas.369  The 
Task Force also proposed to require all new residential 
buildings of three stories or less to be constructed pursuant to 
 
The IgCC requires that building envelopes exceed the requirements of the 
International Energy Conservation Code by no less than 10%.  IgCC § 605 (2012). 
360. This is not surprising given that the IgCC is not specifically targeted at 
disaster resiliency and the IgCC was intended to be a set of minimum standards. 
361. See NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at HT4-1. 
362. Id. at HT6-1.  
363. Id. at HT7-1. 
364. Id. at HT9-1. 
365. Id. at HT10-1.  The IgCC has no such requirement, but has a verification 
requirement providing that “prior to issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the field 
inspector shall confirm the installation of luminaires, type and quantity; lamps, type, 
wattage and quantity, and ballasts, type and performance for not less than one 
representative luminaire of each type, for consistency with the approved construction 
documents.”  IgCC § 608.10 (2012). 
366. See NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at HT12-1.  The IgCC 
provides code enforcement officials with the discretion to waive its lighting efficiency 
requirements because of emergency lighting considerations.  IgCC § 608.9. 
367. See NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at HR13-1. 
368. Id. at HT15-1 to HT18-1; see also id. at HT19-1 (the Task Force also 
recommends including a zoning bonus as an incentive for buildings that make stairs 
prominent and accessible). 
369. Id. at HT20-1. 
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Energy Star standards.370  The IgCC does not apply to 
residential structures of three stories or less. 
One area in need of further evaluation is the inclusion of 
multiple compliance options or, alternatively, the use of 
ASHRAE Standard 90.1 (recommended by the Task Force) 
versus the more rigorous ASHRAE Standard 189.1 
(incorporated as a compliance option in the IgCC).371  
Currently, the New York Energy Conservation Code essentially 
consists of two separate but comprehensive codes, allowing 
individual designers to choose as their compliance option either 
ASHRAE Standard 90.1 or Chapter 8 of the International 
Energy Conservation Code.  The Task Force found that the 
simultaneous enforcement of two codes is no longer tenable and 
proposed requiring all commercial buildings to comply with 
ASHRAE 90.1.372  Similarly, prior to the creation of the IgCC, 
the ICC’s International Energy Conservation Code referenced 
ASHRAE 90.1, allowing individual designers to choose 
ASHRAE 90.1 as a compliance path.  This essentially created 
two compliance paths in every participating jurisdiction.  The 
IgCC eliminated this system by including ASHRAE 189.1 as an 
optional compliance pathway for jurisdictions, not individual 
designers, to adopt on a mandatory basis.373 
Nevertheless, by incorporating many enforceable standards 
equivalent to IgCC standards and some that exceed IgCC 
standards, the task force proposals certainly are progressive.  
However, the Urban Green Council concluded in its report 90 
 
370. Id. at EF2-1. 
371. Standard 90.1, Energy Standard for Buildings except Low-Rise Residential 
Buildings, provides minimum requirements for the energy-efficient design of new and 
renovated or retrofitted buildings.  ASHRAE, STANDARD 90.1, ENERGY STANDARD FOR 
BUILDINGS EXCEPT LOW-RISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS (2013).  90.1-2004 has been 
approved by DOE as the minimum standard for all states.  ASHRAE Standard 189.1-
2011, Standard for the Design of High-Performance, Green Buildings except Low-Rise 
Residential Buildings, provides minimum requirements for the siting, design, and 
construction of high performance, green buildings.  ASHRAE, STANDARD 189.1:  
STANDARD FOR THE DESIGN OF HIGH PERFORMANCE, GREEN BUILDINGS EXCEPT LOW-
RISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS FAQ (2014), available at www.ashrae.org/greenstandard 
[http://perma.cc/9RN9-EUCN]. 
372. See NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at EF1-1. 
373. INT’L CODE COUNCIL, SYNOPSIS—INTERNATIONAL GREEN CONSTRUCTION CODE, 
PUBLIC VERSION 2.0, NOVEMBER 2010 2 (2010), available at http://www.iccsafe.org/cs/ 
IGCC/Documents/PublicVersion/IGCC_PV2_Synopsis.pdf [http://perma.cc/4QA9-
6VG7]. 
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by 50:  NYC Can Reduce Its Carbon Footprint that the City can 
and must go further:  “the extreme emission reductions 
required to minimize climate change are in fact possible using 
technologies that are known and in almost all cases currently 
available, and that the costs are comparable to the lifetime 
savings.”374  To achieve these deeper reductions, the report 
recommends, among other things, the use of even greater air 
sealing and heat recovery systems, photovoltaic panels to 
produce renewable electricity on site, mini-split heat pumps for 
most apartments, ground-source heat pumps for commercial 
and larger residential buildings, and air-source heat pumps for 
hot water.375  Notably, the report found that “many of the 
measures introduced to mitigate climate change also increase 
building resilience . . . . For example, greater thermal integrity 
ensures buildings that will remain more habitable without 
services such as heat, hot water, or electricity.”376 
F. Lack of Intergovernmental Integration—A Formidable 
Obstacle to Coastal Climate Change Resilience 
In its 2015 report NPCC2 concluded that it is “essential” that 
New York City “facilitate an ongoing and continuous process of 
stakeholder-scientist interactions” with coordination between 
the relevant experts and multiple scales of government, 
including the other municipalities of the New York 
metropolitan region.377  Implicit in this recommendation are 
two critiques—one based on the failure of the City’s current 
initiatives to effectively incorporate the City’s extensive 
suburbs, and another based on the need for increased 
integration with relevant state and federal agencies. 
 
374. URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, supra note 273, at 1. 
375. Id. at 4. 
376. Id. 
377. NPCC 2015, supra note 97, at 16 (“Collaboration across multiple scales of 
government will help to ensure that the climate science developed for the New York 
metropolitan region informs and draws from the best available information, thereby 
positioning residents and planners to confront expected future changes in the most 
effective way possible.”). 
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1.  Municipalities Must Look Elsewhere for a Regional Model 
that Incorporates a Hub City and Its Extensive Suburbs 
It probably goes without saying that New York City’s suite of 
initiatives does not provide a comprehensive adaptation and 
mitigation model for suburban municipalities.  However, given 
New York City’s expertise and resources,378 the City is well 
poised to work with its extensive surrounding suburban 
communities (beyond the five boroughs) to create a 
comprehensive regional climate change adaptation and 
mitigation plan.  Moreover, because the impacts of climate 
change and the strategies to adapt to those impacts do not 
happen in isolation, municipalities must take care that a 
particular strategy, which may reduce vulnerability or decrease 
emissions in one area, does not increase risk and vulnerability 
in another area.379  Indeed, in its latest report, NPCC2 urged 
New York City to both strengthen the initiatives in A Stronger, 
More Resilient New York and to expand them “to the entire 
New York metropolitan region.”380 
The need for an integrated strategy that prevents, for 
example, development from moving from low-emissions 
generating areas to high-emissions generating areas may be 
particularly acute in and around New York City, where the 
difference between urban and suburban emissions is greater 
than in many other areas of the country.381  Based on their 
finding of a strong negative correlation between emissions and 
the level of land use controls restricting development,382 
 
378. See ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 3 (commenting on NYC 
expertise and resources by Mayor de Blasio).  
379. Salkin, supra note 223, at 925 (finding that integration is a key challenge for 
local governments facing climate change risks). 
380. NPCC 2015, supra note 97, at 16. 
381. See Edward L. Glaeser & Matthew E. Kahn, The Greenness of Cities:  Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions and Urban Development, 67 J. URBAN ECON. 404, 408 (2010) 
(finding that New York City had the most extreme emissions difference between the 
central city and suburbs, based on a comparative study of 48 metropolitan areas, and 
estimating that suburban development around New York City causes more than 300 
dollars more damage in carbon dioxide emissions than central city development, based 
on an assumed social cost figure of 43 dollars per ton of CO2).  Given the 2000 and 2001 
vintage of some of the data used for this study, results should be considered illustrative 
only.  See id. at 405 (citing sources of data and describing study methodology). 
382. Id. at 405.  Glaeser and Kahn based their comparisons between metropolitan 
areas (as opposed to within metropolitan areas) on data from 66 major metropolitan 
areas in the United States.  Id. at 405.  
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Edward Glaeser and Matthew Kahn hypothesized that “current 
land use restrictions may be doing exactly the opposite of what 
a climate change activist may have hoped.  Those restrictions, 
often implemented for local environmental reasons (such as to 
preserve open space or reduce neighborhood traffic), seem to 
push new development towards the least environmentally 
friendly urban areas.”383 
Moreover, regardless of whether restrictive urban land use 
regulations cause increased suburban development, the need 
for climate change adaptation and mitigation regional plans 
that integrate the extensive suburban communities 
surrounding hub cities in the United States is nevertheless 
acute.  The majority of the population resides in suburbs, 
suburbs have a higher per capita carbon footprint than urban 
areas, and suburbs are less likely to take action on climate 
change.384  By 2040, the United States is projected to add 93 
million new homes to accommodate its rapidly growing 
population.385  Based on current trends, most of these homes 
will be single-family homes that are significantly less energy 
efficient than their multifamily counterparts;386 and, based on 
current planning practices, the occupants of these single-family 
homes will continue to commute by car to work, play, and 
shop.387  Suburban communities need encouragement and 
 
383. Id. at 408 (citations omitted).  
384. John R. Nolon, The Land Use Stabilization Wedge Strategy:  Shifting Ground 
to Mitigate Climate Change, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 3–4 (2009); see 
also Hossein Estiri, Residential Energy (and Water) Expenditure and the City-Suburb 
Dichotomy; A Case Study of the Puget Sound Region, WA 1 (Dep’t of Urban Design & 
Plan. Univ. of Wash., Working Paper, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246596  [http://perma.cc/K42Y-L355] (reporting results 
from case study of Washington state Puget Sound region showing that, “in general, the 
likelihood of living in a housing unit with high energy (and water) cost was higher in 
the suburb and slightly lower in the city,” “suburban renters are more likely to live in 
housing units with high energy and water costs[, and t]he effect of the number of 
children in the suburbs was greater on the estimated odds of living in a high-
expenditure housing unit than in the city”); but see id. at 2 (arguing that research 
about variations in residential energy consumption within metropolitan areas is 
inconclusive). 
385. Nolon, supra note 384, at 3–4 (citing studies). 
386. Id. (citing studies).  
387. See Edward L. Glaeser, Green Cities, Brown Suburbs:  To Save the Planet, 
Build More Skyscrapers—Especially in California, 2009 CITY J. 50 (2009) (finding 
suburban development patterns often facilitate consumption of higher quantities of the 
bundle of housing services, including bigger and newer homes and more use of cars, 
and lower density); David Brownstone & Thomas F. Golob, The Impact Of Residential 
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support to assess their climate vulnerabilities, plan and 
implement adaptation and mitigation strategies, and, in some 
cases, expand their current efforts beyond building and 
vehicles initiatives to land use and planning measures.388  As 
one commentator has noted, “[S]o far, climate action has 
extended slowly to suburbia.  Central cities in smart growth 
states have taken on climate change, but vast swaths of 
metropolitan suburbia continue to reproduce a political 
geography of local free-riding.”389 
Thus, effective adaptation planning and implementation, as 
well as mitigation, will benefit from integrated adaptation and 
mitigation plans that recognize the distinct needs of suburbs 
and the interplay between urban hubs and their often-
extensive networks of suburbs.390  New York City and other 
hub cities striving to mitigate climate change and increase 
local resilience would therefore be wise to pursue an integrated 
planning strategy that includes surrounding suburban 
communities.  As Touro Law Center Dean Patricia Salkin 
urges in the context of New York State’s climate change 
initiatives, “the true potential of [the State’s substantial 
activity with respect to climate change and energy efficiency 
issues] will not be fully realized” without “a coordinated, 
comprehensive, and fully integrated inter-jurisdictional 
approach to addressing these challenges.”391 
 
Density on Vehicle Usage and Energy Consumption, 65 J. URB. ECON. 91, 91–92 (2009) 
(finding suburban development patterns often facilitate consumption of higher 
quantities of the bundle of housing services); William A.V. Clark et al., Residential 
Mobility and Neighbourhood Outcomes, 21 HOUSING STUD. 323, 323 (2006) (finding 
that households often “move up” to higher quality houses and neighborhoods, which are 
often in suburban locations). 
388. Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts:  Possibilities for Small 
and Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, National, and International 
Networks, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 440 (2012). 
389. Yonn Dierwechter, Metropolitan Geographies of US Climate Action:  Cities, 
Suburbs, and the Local Divide in Global Responsibilities, 12 J. ENVTL. POL’Y & PLAN. 
59, 79 (2010); Osofsky, supra note 388. 
390. See Osofsky, supra note 388 (finding that not only are suburbs are distinct 
from urban cores, different types of suburbs exist, each of which present distinct 
challenges and opportunities for building community resilience).  See also WGII 
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 29, at 25 (“Adaptation is place- and context-
specific, with no single approach for reducing risks appropriate across all settings (high 
confidence).”).  
391. Salkin, supra note 223, at 926. 
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2.  The Need for More State and Federal Support of Local 
Climate Resilience Planning 
The inadequate participation rates of U.S. municipalities in 
climate change adaptation and mitigation planning are often 
obscured by sources that focus on the work of a few model 
cities.392  Other sources use phrasing or provide accurate, albeit 
incomplete, information that suggests optimistic results when 
in fact the results are anything but.  For example, the Center 
for Climate & Energy Solutions reported in 2006 that “[i]n 
1995, only 15 local governments in the United States were 
engaged in climate protection activities.  11 years later, that 
number has grown to 200 cities.”393  Notwithstanding the 
accuracy of this statement, by failing to alert the reader that 
200 cities is less than 1% of U.S. cities,394 the reader may 
mistakenly interpret the statement as signifying a high U.S. 
participation rate in climate protection activities—when the 
opposite is true.  According to a survey administered by ICLEI 
in 2011, the United States had the lowest percentage of cities 
pursuing adaptation planning395 and the lowest percentage of 
cities that had completed an assessment of their vulnerabilities 
and risks.396 
This troubling data is one of many indicators that local 
governments throughout the United States need more federal 
and state support for their climate resilience planning.397  
 
392. And, indeed, I am guilty of this.  See, e.g., Adams-Schoen, supra note 208, at 
82–90.  
393. CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, Climate Change 101:  Local Action, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE 101:  UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE 1, 8 (2006).  
394. In the United States, there are approximately 36,000 sub-county general-
purpose governments and approximately 3,600 urban areas.  See Lists & Structure of 
Governments—Population of Interest:  Municipalities & Townships, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/govs/go/municipal_township_govs.html [http:// 
perma.cc/96J5-LNNN] (last visited May 21, 2015) (identifying 36,011 sub-county 
general-purpose governments in 2007). 
395. ICLEI 2011 SURVEY, supra note 11, at 14.  
396. Id. at 10.  
397. Although Congress continues to remain gridlocked on climate change, the 
executive branch has taken numerous actions to incentivize climate change adaptation 
at the state and local levels.  See, e.g., FEMA, FP 302-094-2, State Mitigation Plan 
Review Guide (effective Mar. 6, 2016) (requiring state mitigation plans to consider 
changing future conditions, including climate conditions), available at http:// 
www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1425915308555-aba3a873bc5f1140f7320d1ebebd18 
c6/State_Mitigation_Plan_Review_Guide_2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/2YU9-79W4]; see 
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Federal and state law delegates much of the authority relevant 
to climate change adaptation and mitigation to municipal 
governments, and yet state and federal policy fails to support 
local governments in this role through adequate funding, 
technical support, and complimentary laws and policies.398  
Nearly all U.S. cities surveyed by ICLEI reported that securing 
funding for adaptation is a challenge (approximately 90%) and 
only 6% reported that the federal government fully understood 
the realities they face with respect to adaptation.399 
Consistent with the 2011 ICLEI survey results, the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) concluded in a 2013 
report that, although the federal government plays a critical 
role in producing the information needed to facilitate informed 
local infrastructure adaptation decisions, this information is 
not easily accessible to local decision makers.400  The governors, 
mayors, and other local leaders on the President’s Task Force 
on Climate Preparedness and Resilience also concluded in their 
report to the President in November 2014 that “projects and 
investments are being advanced without adequate and 
coordinated consideration of the project design or alternatives 
relative to climate impacts and greenhouse gas emissions, a 
direction that generates unacceptable public health, safety, and 
financial risks for communities.”401  Similarly, a 2014 
 
also Third Allocation, Waivers, and Alternative Requirements for Grantees Receiving 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Disaster Recovery Funds in Response 
to Hurricane Sandy, 79 F.R. 62182, 62186 (Oct. 16, 2014), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-10-16/pdf/2014-24662.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
CSE5-7CRA] (allocating $335 million in federal funds to New York for the first phase of 
the “Big U,” a plan for the protection of 10 continuous miles of New York City).   
398. See John R. Nolon, Climate Change and Sustainable Development:  The Quest 
for Green Communities, Part II, PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 5 (2009); but see Community Risk 
and Resiliency Act, 2014 N.Y. Laws 355 (directing state agencies to prepare model 
municipal laws taking into consideration sea-level rise and other climate-related 
events and “develop additional guidance on the use of resiliency measures that utilize 
natural resources and natural processes to reduce risk”). 
399. ICLEI 2011 SURVEY, supra note 11, at 22–24.  
400. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO REPORT:  FUTURE FEDERAL ADAPTATION 
EFFORTS COULD BETTER SUPPORT LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE DECISION MAKERS 80 (Apr. 
12, 2013), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-242 [http://perma.cc/5935-8ZDB]. 
401. See THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT’S STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LEADERS TASK 
FORCE ON CLIMATE PREPAREDNESS AND RESILIENCE:  RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE 
PRESIDENT 20 (recommendation 2.7) (Nov. 2014), available at https://www.white 
house.gov/sites/default/files/docs/task_force_report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P9V-
ZXSH]. 
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Georgetown Climate Center report on how to improve federal 
programs to support local climate change preparedness found 
that many local governments “have been looking to the federal 
government for help and guidance, only to run into challenges 
tapping into federal programs and resources.”402 
Interestingly, the Georgetown report concluded that 
perception is often worse than reality and a number of 
relatively small changes could provide local government with 
at least some of the needed support: 
 
While it is true that there are some limitations, barriers [to 
leveraging federal programs to promote adaptation] are often 
more perceived than real. 
 While additional resources are certainly needed, adaptation 
does not require expansive new programs or legislation.  Entities 
at all levels of government have plans, tools, and resources that 
can be amended, repurposed, or deployed to support adaptation. 
 Where barriers to adaptation do exist, short-term workarounds 
are often available while working towards long-term fixes. 
 Funding constraints limit opportunities for sensible 
investments in adaptation.  The way federal agencies currently 
make investment decisions often appear [sic] to be “penny wise 
and pound foolish.”403 
 
Assuming plans, tools and resources exist that can be 
“repurposed, or deployed” to support local governments, and 
“short-term workarounds” are indeed available, any delay in 
comprehensive assessment and implementation of federal 
support for local government adaptation (and mitigation) 
initiatives seems, at best, misguided, and, at worst, 
negligent.404  With respect to the “penny wise and pound 
foolish” critique, many sources, including New York City, have 
completed economic analyses that show that mitigation and 
adaptation efforts require large upfront investment, but result 
in long-term cost savings of many times the initial 
 
402. GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR, PREPARING OUR COMMUNITIES FOR CLIMATE 
IMPACTS:  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FEDERAL ACTION 5 (2014), available at http://www. 
georgetownclimate.org/sites/www.georgetownclimate.org/files/GCC%20-%20 
Recommendations%20for%20Federal%20Action%20-%20September%202014.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6JYR-KJMS]. 
403. Id. at 6.  
404. See generally Burkett, supra note 73 (discussing potential tort liability for 
failure to mitigate climate-change related hazards). 
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investment.405  Additionally, these initial investments also 
result in significant nonmonetary benefits like increased public 
health and wellbeing.406 
One step that state and federal governments can take to 
support local adaptation and mitigation initiatives is to remove 
existing preemption hurdles.  Municipalities face preemption 
hurdles with respect to numerous potential mitigation 
initiatives.407  California’s efforts to reduce GHG emissions 
from cars illustrates “[t]he dynamic and topsy-turvy reception 
of state climate efforts.”408  As summarized by Kristen Engel 
and Marc Miller, California had to 
 
win its effort to obtain a judicial reversal of EPA’s denial of a 
waiver of federal preemption under the federal Clean Air 
Act[,] . . . survive a legal challenge filed by the automobile 
industry claiming that the state’s standards are preempted by 
 
405. See, e.g., MULTIHAZARD MITIGATION COUNCIL, NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION 
SAVES:  AN INDEPENDENT STUDY TO ASSESS THE FUTURE SAVINGS FROM MITIGATION 
ACTIVITIES 5 (2005), available at https://www.nibs.org/?page=mmc_projects#nhms 
[https://perma.cc/7VJA-4LGK] (reporting in 2005 that, on average, each dollar spent on 
hazard mitigation (i.e., adaptation) saves society $4 in avoided future losses); 
STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 40 (claiming implementation of 37 
“Phase I” measures could reduce expected losses in a Sandy-like storm in the 2050s by 
up to 25%, or more than $22 billion); MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY iii (July 2009) (estimating $520 billion invested in 
non-transportation energy efficiency in the United States by 2020 could generate 
energy savings over $1.2 trillion); see generally Klass, supra note 292, at 10040 
(discussing McKinsey & Company report and other cost savings from mitigation 
initiatives). 
406. See, e.g., LUCAS DE MONCUIT, CARBONN CITIES CLIMATE REGISTRY:  2013 
ANNUAL REPORT 21 (2014) (“[c]urrent data reveal that supporting the green urban 
economy and improving urban air quality are the most common co-benefits of 
mitigation actions while improving public health is seen as a co-benefit for 18% of 
adaptation actions”). 
407. See, e.g., Air Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration Inst. v. City of 
Albuquerque, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1134 (D.N.M. 2010) (holding that code provisions 
that required HVAC systems and equipment in small retail and office buildings and 
one- and two-family detached dwellings and townhouses to comply with minimum 
efficiency standards were preempted by the federal Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act); see also Elliot Schatmeier, Avoiding Albuquerque:  How Incentive-Based Green 
Infrastructure Codes May Regulate Appliance Efficiency Standards and Avoid Federal 
Preemption, COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.columbiaenvironmental 
law.org/articles/avoiding-albuquerque-how-incentive-based-green-building-codes-may-
regulate-appliance-efficiency-standards-and-avoid-federal-preemption [http://perma.cc/ 
6ZKQ-HF5E]. 
408. ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:  LAW AND POLICY 
1143 (6th ed. 2011).  
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federal fuel efficiency laws[, and] . . . counter arguments by the 
U.S. Department of Transportation that California’s standards 
[were] preempted by a federal fuel economy law.409 
 
New York City’s attempts to limit the GHG emissions from 
its substantial taxicab fleet have not fared so well.410  In 2007, 
the City announced in its long-term comprehensive 
sustainability plan, PlaNYC:  Greener, Greater New York, a 
policy of “doubl[ing] the efficiency of new taxis by 2012” by 
limiting taxicab emissions.411  The City’s Taxi and Limousine 
Commission (“TLC”) implemented the policy by passing a rule 
requiring taxicabs to meet a minimum miles-per-gallon 
rating.412  One month later, on May 22, 2007, Mayor Bloomberg 
announced that the City planned to make the taxicab fleet fully 
hybrid by 2012.413  A year later, a federal district court 
invalidated the City rule, holding that rule was preempted 
under the federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
(“EPCA”), which expressly preempts state or local actions 
“related to fuel economy standards.”414  The City responded by 
creating a system of financial incentives and disincentives to 
encourage taxi owners to switch to hybrid vehicles by reducing 
the amount they can charge to lease vehicles that do not have a 
hybrid or clean diesel engine.  A federal district court found 
 
409. Kristen H. Engel & Marc L. Miller, State Governance:  Leadership on Climate 
Change, Ch. 29, in AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA 449 (J. Dernbach ed., Envtl. 
L. Inst. 2009); see also California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; 
Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 
and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor 
Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156, 12,156–12,157 (Mar. 6, 2008) (denying California request 
for waiver of the preemption provision in section 209 of the Clean Air Act); Notice of 
Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and 
Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 
74 Fed. Reg. 32,744, 32,744–32,746 (July 8, 2009) (reversing prior decision and 
granting waiver); GLICKSMAN & MARKELL, supra note 408, at 1143 (quoting Engels and 
Miller and discussing federal preemption of state and local climate change initiatives, 
and federal savings clauses). 
410. See GREENER, GREATER, supra note 11, at 122–24 (describing plan to reduce 
GHG emissions from taxi and car-for-hire fleet of more than 30,000 vehicles); see also 
ICLEI PLANYC CASE STUDY, supra note 30, at 41 (“Taxis travel an average of 80,000 
miles per year in New York City.”). 
411. GREENER, GREATER, supra note 11, at 122–24.  
412. TLC Rule § 3.03(c)(10)–(11), 35 R.C.N.Y. § 3-03(c)(10)–(11). 
413. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 7837(PAC), 2008 
WL 4866021, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter “Metro. Taxicab I”].  
414. Id.  
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that this regulation was a de facto mandate that related to fuel 
economy standards and emissions regulations, and was 
therefore preempted under both EPCA and the Clean Air 
Act.415  Despite these preemption hurdles, by 2010, the City’s 
advocacy combined with benefits inherent to hybrid vehicles 
such as reduced fuel costs, resulted in conversion of 25% of the 
13,237-vehicle New York City taxi fleet to hybrids.416  
Nevertheless, the circuitous—and as a result costly and 
delayed—routes to success for both the City and California 
with respect to these vehicle emissions initiatives illustrate the 
obstacles preemption challenges pose to certain local climate 
change mitigation actions. 
Another step state and federal governments can take now to 
support local adaptation and mitigation initiatives is to support 
the delivery of downscaled climate data and the development of 
regional and sub-regional projections and mapping.417  The 
GAO recommended in its 2013 report that a federal entity 
designated by the Executive Office of the President work with 
agencies to:  (1) “identify for decision makers the ‘best 
available’ climate-related information for infrastructure 
planning,” and (2) “clarify sources of local assistance for 
incorporating climate-related information and analysis into 
infrastructure planning . . . .”418  Federal and state support that 
 
415. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83, 105–106 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) [hereinafter “Metro. Taxicab II”], aff’d, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(agreeing with preemption conclusion under EPCA and upholding preliminary 
injunction against city); see also Ophir v. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86, 94 (D. 
Mass. 2009) (holding Boston ordinance requiring hybrid taxicabs ‘‘related to’’ fuel 
economy standards and was thus preempted under EPCA’s preemption provision even 
though the ordinance did not include a specific miles-per-gallon standard); but see 
Green Alliance Taxi Cab Ass’n v. King Cnty., No. C 08-1048 RAJ, 2010 WL 2643369, at 
*5 (W.D. Wash. June 29, 2010) (denying motion for summary judgment and 
distinguishing Metro. Taxicab I, Metro. Taxicab II, and Ophir on basis that King 
County green taxi incentive program was voluntary and did not “constitute a mandate 
applicable to the entire taxi industry”). 
416. ICLEI PLANYC CASE STUDY, supra note 30, at 41. 
417. But see New York Community Risk and Resiliency Act, Ch. 355, N.Y. Laws of 
2014 (directing state agencies to prepare climate projections and model municipal laws 
taking into consideration sea-level rise and other climate-related events).  
418. GAO, supra note 400, at 87.  The GAO also advised that revision of the White 
House Counsel on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) guidelines on National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) reviews of climate change impacts and risks could 
provide much-needed support to state and local governments.  Id.  CEQ has since 
issued draft revised NEPA guidelines.  CEQ, REVISED DRAFT GUIDANCE (released Dec. 
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ensures the availability of data and information at a resolution 
relevant to local decision makers could go a long way in 
supporting local decision-makers’ efforts to incorporate 
potential climate change impacts in infrastructure planning. 
CONCLUSION 
New York City, like other major cities around the world, has 
acknowledged the problem of climate change, undertaken a 
comprehensive risk assessment, created a suite of adaptation 
and mitigation planning initiatives, and begun to implement 
proactive policies to decrease the city’s contribution to the 
problem and to make the city less vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change.  The City’s initiatives put it ahead of the pack, 
especially as compared to other U.S. municipalities—and this 
is particularly true of its integrated mitigation and adaptation 
planning, its transparent climate change-related data analysis 
initiatives including NPCC, and its comprehensive reform of 
building and other related codes.  The City’s commitment to 
reduce GHG emissions 80% by 2050 from 2005 levels and its 
progress toward that goal, as well as the City’s 
acknowledgement of the disparate impact of climate change 
and related risks on vulnerable populations and its 
commitment to prioritize related planning efforts are also 
laudable.  Each of these initiatives provides useful models for 
other municipalities. 
However, the City faces a host of wicked policy binds, 
ineffective regional structures, a lack of support at the federal 
level, and numerous conditions that constrain the City’s ability 
to remain resilient—including its massive population and 
coastal geography, and the likelihood of continued acceleration 
of warming and rising seas.  In light of this, PlaNYC’s 
persuasive “toughness” theme risks undermining the City’s 
robust data analysis and reporting initiatives by instilling in 
New Yorkers a false sense of security with respect to both the 
scope of the problem and their local government’s ability to 
protect them from it.  The City is in a wicked policy bind when 
it comes to messaging, to be sure.  On the one hand, it must 
 
2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nepa_revised_ 
draft_ghg_guidance_searchable.pdf [https://perma.cc/EHG3-535T].   
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garner support for plans and justify the costs of implementing 
them, and, on the other hand, the City must maintain 
constituent confidence in its ability to govern.  But, regardless, 
messaging that has the effect of encouraging rebuilding and 
development in vulnerable areas or otherwise leads to 
unknowing assumption of climate-related risks is 
unconscionable.  Moreover, as a practical matter, such 
messaging may cause constituents to take actions that 
undermine the effectiveness of the City’s efforts to increase 
resilience. 
The City faces an equally wicked policy bind with respect to 
waterfront development.  Given the foreseeable risks of 
increasingly intensive and frequent coastal storms, flooding 
and storm surges, coastal municipalities must carefully 
evaluate their waterfront development policies to assure 
consistency with future climate risks and vulnerability and 
adopt regulations that curtail or eliminate waterfront 
development in high-risk areas, encourage or require relocation 
away from the most vulnerable areas, and take maximum 
advantage of opportunities to develop natural flood-mitigation 
infrastructure. 
Ultimately, the City’s climate change resilience initiatives 
put the city ahead of the pack and include features that provide 
a model for other coastal communities.  But, notwithstanding 
this, the initiatives may still fall short of what is likely 
required to sufficiently “moderate[] harm” from dangerous 
interference with the climate system.419 
 
 
419. See AR4 WGII, supra note 1, at 6 (defining “adaptation”). 
